Abstract: In many of the studies reviewed in this book, eavesdropping takes the
following form: a subject has the opportunity to monitor, or eavesdrop upon, an
interaction between two other animals,Aand B. The subject then uses the information
obtained through these observations to assess A`s and B`s relative dominance
or attractiveness as a mate (e.g. Mennill et al., 2002; Ch. 2). For example, Oliveira
et al. (1998) found that male fighting fish Betta splendens that had witnessed two
other males involved in an aggressive interaction subsequently responded more
strongly to the loser of that interaction than the winner. Subjects-behaviour could
not have been influenced by any inherent differences between the two males, because
subjects responded equally strongly to the winner and the loser of competitive
interactions they had not observed. Similarly, Peake et al. (2001) presented
male great tits Parus major with the opportunity to monitor an apparent competitive
interaction between two strangers by simulating a singing contest using two
loudspeakers. The relative timing of the singing bouts (as measured by the degree
of overlap between the two songs) provided information about each “contestants”
relative status. Following the singing interaction, one of the “contestants” was
introduced into the male`s territory. Males responded significantly less strongly
to singers that had apparently just “lost” the interaction (see also McGregor &
Dabelsteen, 1996; Naguib et al., 1999; Ch. 2).
What information does an individual acquire when it eavesdrops on others?
In theory, an eavesdropper could acquire information of many different sorts:
about A, about B, about the relationship between A and B, or about the place of
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A`s and B`s relationship in a larger social framework. The exact information acquired
will probably reflect the particular species social structure. For example,
songbirds like great tits live in communities in which six or seven neighbours
surround each territory-holding male. Males appear to benefit from the knowledge
that certain individuals occupy specific areas (e.g. Brooks & Falls, 1975), that
competitive interactions between two different neighbours have particular outcomes,
and that these outcomes are stable over time. We would, therefore, expect
an eavesdropping great tit not only to learn that neighbour A was dominant to
neighbour B, for example, but also to form the expectation that A was likely to
defeat B in all future encounters. More speculatively, because the outcome of territorial
interactions are often site specific (reviewed by Bradbury & Vehrencamp,
1998), we would expect eavesdropping tits to learn further that A dominates B
in some areas but B dominates A in others. In contrast, the information gained
from monitoring neighbours interactions would unlikely be sufficient to allow
the eavesdropper to rank all of its neighbours in a linear dominance hierarchy,
because not all neighbouring males would come into contact with one another.
Such information would be difficult if not impossible to acquire; it might also be
of little functional value.
In contrast, species that live in large, permanent social groups have a much
greater opportunity to monitor the social interactions of many different individuals
simultaneously. Monkey species such as baboons Papio cynocephalus, for
example, typically live in groups of 80 or more individuals, which include several
matrilineal families arranged in a stable, linear dominance rank order (Silk et al.,
1999). Offspring assume ranks similar to those of their mothers, and females maintain
close bonds with their matrilineal kin throughout their lives. Cutting across
these stable long-term relationships based on rank and kinship are more transient
bonds: for example, the temporary associations formed between unrelated
females whose infants are of similar ages, and the “friendships” formed between
adult males and lactating females as an apparent adaptation against infanticide
(Palombit et al., 1997, 2001). In order to compete successfully within such groups, it
would seem advantageous for individuals to recognize who outranks whom, who
is closely bonded to whom, and who is likely to be allied to whom (Harcourt, 1988,
1992; Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990; see below). The ability to adopt a third party`s perspective
and discriminate among the social relationships that exist among others
would seem to be of great selective benefit.
In this chapter, we review evidence for eavesdropping in selected primate
species and we consider what sort of information is acquired when one individual
observes or listens in on the interactions of others. We then compare eavesdropping
by primates with eavesdropping in other animal species, focusing on both
potential differences and directions for further research

Abstract: It is widely accepted that many species of nonhuman animals appear to engage in transitive inference,
producing appropriate responses to novel pairings of non-adjacent members of an ordered series
without previous experience of these pairings. Some researchers have taken this capability as
providing direct evidence that these animals reason. Others resist such declarations, favouring instead
explanations in terms of associative conditioning. Associative accounts of transitive inference have
been refined in application to a simple 5-element learning task that is the main paradigm for
laboratory investigations of the phenomenon, but it remains unclear how well those accounts
generalise to more information-rich environments such as social hierarchies which may contain scores
of individuals, and where rapid learning is important. The case of transitive inference is an example of
a more general dispute between proponents of associative accounts and advocates of more cognitive
accounts of animal behaviour. Examination of the specific details of transitive inference suggests
some lessons for the wider debate.