Abstract: Locoweed (Oxytropis sericea) is a serious poisoning problem for horses grazing on infested rangelands in the western United States. Our objectives were to determine 1) whether lithium chloride or apomorphine would condition aversions to palatable foods, and at what doses, and 2) whether horses could be averted to fresh locoweed in a pen and grazing situation. Apomorphine was not an acceptable aversive agent because at the dose required to condition an aversion (> or = 0.17 mg/kg BW), apomorphine induced unacceptable behavioral effects. Lithium chloride given via stomach tube at 190 mg/kg BW conditioned strong and persistent aversions to palatable feeds with minor signs of distress. Pen and grazing tests were conducted in Colorado to determine if horses could be averted to fresh locoweed. Pen tests indicated that most horses (5/6) were completely averted from locoweed. Treated horses ate 34 g of fresh locoweed compared to 135 g for controls (P < 0.01) during three pen tests when offered 150 g per test. One horse (T) in the treatment group ate locoweed each time it was offered in the pen, but ate no locoweed while grazing. In the grazing trial, control horses averaged 8.6% of bites of locoweed (P < 0.01) during the grazing portion of the study, whereas treated horses averaged <0.5%. One treated horse (S) accounted for all consumption; he consumed 15% of his bites as locoweed in a grazing bout on d 2 of the field study. Thereafter, he was dosed a second time with lithium chloride and ate no locoweed in the subsequent 5 d. Three of six horses required two pairings of lithium chloride with fresh locoweed to condition a complete aversion. The results of this study indicate that horses can be averted from locoweed using lithium chloride as an aversive agent, and this may provide a management tool to reduce the risk of intoxication for horses grazing locoweed-infested rangeland.

Abstract: In many different species it is common for animals to spend large portions of their lives in groups. Such groups need to divide available resources amongst the individuals they contain and this is often achieved by means of a dominance hierarchy. Sometimes hierarchies are stable over a long period of time and new individuals slot into pre-determined positions, but there are many situations where this is not so and a hierarchy is formed out of a group of individuals meeting for the first time. There are several different models both of the formation of such dominance hierarchies and of already existing hierarchies. These models often treat the two phases as entirely separate, whereas in reality, if there is a genuine formation phase to the hierarchy, behaviour in this phase will be governed by the rewards available, which in turn depends upon how the hierarchy operates once it has been formed. This paper describes a method of unifying models of these two distinct phases, assuming that the hierarchy formed is stable. In particular a framework is introduced which allows a variety of different models of each of the two parts to be used in conjunction with each other, thus enabling a wide range of situations to be modelled. Some examples are given to show how this works in practice.

Abstract: The selfish herd hypothesis predicts that aggregations form because individuals move toward one another to minimize their own predation risk. The “dilemma of the selfish herd” is that movement rules that are easy for individuals to follow, fail to produce true aggregations, while rules that produce aggregations require individual behavior so complex that one may doubt most animals can follow them. If natural selection at the individual level is responsible for herding behavior, a solution to the dilemma must exist. Using computer simulations, we examined four different movement rules. Relative predation risk was different for all four movement rules (p<0.05). We defined three criteria for measuring the quality of a movement rule. A good movement rule should (a) be statistically likely to benefit an individual that follows it, (b) be something we can imagine most animals are capable of following, and (c) result in a centrally compact flock. The local crowded horizon rule, which allowed individuals to take the positions of many flock-mates into account, but decreased the influence of flock-mates with distance, best satisfied these criteria. The local crowded horizon rule was very sensitive to the animal's perceptive ability. Therefore, the animal's ability to detect its neighbors is an important factor in the dynamics of group formation.

Abstract: In the present study we examined the relationship among handedness, immune functioning, and behavioural reactivity in rhesus macaques. We used the absolute number of CD4+ (T-helper) and CD8+ (T-suppressor) cells as dependent measures of immune functioning. We derived reactivity profiles from behavioural responses to a threat, and hand preference profiles from a quadrupedal food-reaching test. The results indicate positive correlations between the frequency of right versus left hand reaches and the absolute number of CD4+ cells, and between the frequency of right versus left hand reaches and the degree of human-directed aggression in response to an invasive threat. Immune measures were not associated with the strength of hand preference. These results are consistent with and extend previous findings obtained with rodents to nonhuman primates and provide further support for the view that behavioural lateralisation is associated with immune functioning and behavioural reactivity.

Abstract: Human cooperation is an evolutionary puzzle. Unlike other creatures, people frequently cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers, often in large groups, with people they will never meet again, and when reputation gains are small or absent. These patterns of cooperation cannot be explained by the nepotistic motives associated with the evolutionary theory of kin selection and the selfish motives associated with signalling theory or the theory of reciprocal altruism. Here we show experimentally that the altruistic punishment of defectors is a key motive for the explanation of cooperation. Altruistic punishment means that individuals punish, although the punishment is costly for them and yields no material gain. We show that cooperation flourishes if altruistic punishment is possible, and breaks down if it is ruled out. The evidence indicates that negative emotions towards defectors are the proximate mechanism behind altruistic punishment. These results suggest that future study of the evolution of human cooperation should include a strong focus on explaining altruistic punishment.