Abstract: Conflict management is one of the primary requirements for social complexity. Of the many forms of conflict management, one of the rarest and most interesting is third-party policing, or intervening impartially to control conflict. Third-party policing should be hard to evolve because policers personally pay a cost for intervening, while the benefits are diffused over the whole group. In this study we investigate the incidence and costs of policing in a primate society. We report quantitative evidence of non-kin policing in the nonhuman primate, the pigtailed macaque. We find that policing is effective at reducing the intensity of or terminating conflict when performed by the most powerful individuals. We define a measure, social power consensus, that predicts effective low-cost interventions by powerful individuals and ineffective, relatively costly interventions by low-power individuals. Finally, we develop a simple probabilistic model to explore whether the degree to which policing can effectively reduce the societal cost of conflict is dependent on variance in the distribution of power. Our data and simple model suggest that third-party policing effectiveness and cost are dependent on power structure and might emerge only in societies with high variance in power.

Abstract: Mate-choice copying by females has been reported in fishes (e.g., guppies) and lekking birds. Presumably, females assess males' quality using both information from direct observation of males and information acquired by observing other females' choices. Here, we study mathematically the conditions under which mate-choice copying is advantageous on the basis of Bayesian decision theory. A female may observe the mate choice of another female, called the model female, who has performed an optimal choice based on her own judgment. The conditions required for the focal female to choose the same mate as that chosen by the model female should depend on the male's appearance to her, the reliability of her own judgment of male quality, and the reliability of the model females. When three or more females are involved, the optimal mate choice critically depends on whether multiple model females make decisions independently or they themselves copy the choices of others. If two equally reliable females choose different males, the choice of the second female, made knowing the choice of the first, should have a stronger effect on the choice of the third (focal) female. This “last-choice precedence” should be tested experimentally.

Abstract: Although many variants of the hawk-dove game predict the frequency at which group foraging animals should compete aggressively, none of them can explain why a large number of group foraging animals share food clumps without any overt aggression. One reason for this shortcoming is that hawk-dove games typically consider only a single contest, while most group foraging situations involve opponents that interact repeatedly over discovered food clumps. The present iterated hawk-dove game predicts that in situations that are analogous to a prisoner's dilemma, animals should share the resources without aggression, provided that the number of simultaneously available food clumps is sufficiently large and the number of competitors is relatively small. However, given that the expected gain of an aggressive animal is more variable than the gain expected by nonaggressive individuals, the predicted effect of the number of food items in a clump-clump richness-depends on whether only the mean or both the mean and variability associated with payoffs are considered. More precisely, the deterministic game predicts that aggression should increase with clump richness, whereas the stochastic risk-sensitive game predicts that the frequency of encounters resulting in aggression should peak at intermediate clump richnesses or decrease with increasing clump richness if animals show sensitivity to the variance or coefficient of variation, respectively.

Abstract: Abstract:
Genetic variation in female resistance and tolerance to male mating harassment can affect the outcome of sexually antagonistic mating interactions. We investigated female mating rates and male mating harassment in natural populations of a damselfly (Ischnura elegans). This damselfly species has a heritable sex‐limited polymorphism in females, where one of the morphs is a male mimic (androchrome females). The three female morphs differ in mating rates, and these differences are stable across populations and years. However, the degree of premating resistance toward male mating attempts varied across generations and populations. Male mating harassment of the female morphs changed in a density‐dependent fashion, suggesting that male mate preferences are plastic and vary with the different morph densities. We quantified morph differences in male mating harassment and female fecundity, using path analysis and structural equation modeling. We found variation between the morphs in the fitness consequences of mating, with the fecundity of one of the nonmimetic morphs declining with increasing male mating harassment. However, androchrome females had lower overall fecundity, presumably reflecting a cost of male mimicry. Density‐dependent male mating harassment on the morphs and fecundity costs of male mimicry are thus likely to contribute to the maintenance of this female polymorphism.

Abstract: Self‐organizing‐system approaches have shed significant light on the mechanisms underlying synchronized movements by large groups of animals, such as shoals of fish, flocks of birds, or herds of ungulates. However, these approaches rarely consider conflicts of interest between group members, although there is reason to suppose that such conflicts are commonplace. Here, we demonstrate that, where conflicts exist, individual members of self‐organizing groups can, in principle, increase their influence on group movement destination by strategically changing simple behavioral parameters (namely, movement speed, assertiveness, and social attraction range). However, they do so at the expense of an increased risk of group fragmentation and a decrease in movement efficiency. We argue that the resulting trade‐offs faced by each group member render it likely that group movements are led by those members for which reaching a particular destination is most crucial or group cohesion is least important. We term this phenomenon leading according to “need” or “social indifference,” respectively. Both kinds of leading can occur in the absence of knowledge of or communication about the needs of other group members and without the assumption of altruistic cooperation. We discuss our findings in the light of observations on fish and other vertebrates.