Abstract: It has been proposed that memory for personal experiences (episodic memory, rather than semantic memory) relies on the conscious review of past experience and thus is unique to humans. In an attempt to demonstrate episodic-like memory in animals, we first trained pigeons to respond to the (nonverbal) question “Did you just peck or did you just refrain from pecking?” by training them on a symbolic matching task with differential responding required to the two line-orientation samples and reinforcing the choice of a red comparison if they had pecked and the choice of a green comparison if they had not pecked. Then, in Experiment 1, after providing the conditions for (but not requiring) the pigeons to peck at one new stimulus (a yellow hue) but not at another (a blue hue), we tested them with the new hue stimuli and the red and green comparisons. In Experiment 2, we tested the pigeons with novel stimuli (a circle, which they spontaneously pecked, and a dark response key, which they did not peck) and the red and green comparisons. In both experiments, pigeons chose the comparison appropriate to the response made to the test stimulus. Thus, the pigeons demonstrated that they could remember specific details about their past experiences, a result consistent with the notion that they have the capacity for forming episodic-like memories.

Abstract: When humans acquire a conditional discrimination and are given a novel-sample-comparison choice, they often reject a comparison known to be associated with a different sample and choose the alternative comparison by default (or by exclusion). In Experiment 1, we found that if, following matching training, we replaced both of the samples, acquisition took five times longer than if we replaced only one of the samples. Apparently, the opportunity to reject one of the comparisons facilitated the association of the other sample with the remaining comparison. In Experiment 2, we first trained pigeons to treat two samples differently (to associate Sample A with Comparison 1 and Sample B with Comparison 2) and then trained them to associate one of those samples with a new comparison (e.g., Sample A with Comparison 3) and to associate a novel sample (Sample C) with a different, new comparison (Comparison 4). When Sample B then replaced Sample C, the pigeons showed a significant tendency to choose Comparison 4 over Comparison 3. Thus, when given the opportunity, pigeons will choose by exclusion.

Abstract: C. V. Buhusi, D. Perera, and W. H. Meck (2005) proposed a hypothesis of timing in rats to account for the results of experiments that have used the peak procedure with gaps. According to this hypothesis, the introduction of a gap causes the animal's memory for the pregap interval to passively decay (subjectively shorten) in direct proportion to the duration and salience of the gap. Thus, animals should pause with short, nonsalient gaps but should reset their clock with longer, salient gaps. The present authors suggest that the ambiguity of the gap (i.e., the similarity between the gap and the intertrial interval in both appearance and relative duration) causes the animal to actively reset the clock and prevents adequate assessments of the fate of timed intervals prior to the gap. Furthermore, when the intertrial interval is discriminable from the gap, the evidence suggests that timed intervals prior to the gap are not lost but are retained in memory.

Abstract: Traditional psychological approaches to animal learning and behavior have involved either the atheoretical behaviorist approach proposed by B. F. Skinner (1938), in which input-output relations are described in response to environmental manipulations, or the theoretical behaviorist approach offered by C. L Hull (1943), in which associations mediated by several hypothetical constructs and intervening variables are formed between stimuli and responses. Recently, the application of a cognitive behaviorist approach to animal learning and behavior has been found to have considerable value as a research tool. This perspective has grown out of E. C. Tolman's cognitive approach to learning in which behavior is mediated by mechanisms that are not directly observable but can be inferred from the results of critical experiments. In the present article, the author presents several examples of the successful application of the cognitive behaviorist approach. In each case, the experiments have been designed to distinguish between more traditional mechanisms and those mediated by hypothesized internal representations. These examples were selected because the evidence suggests that some form of active cognitive organization is needed to account for the behavioral results.