Zentall, T. R., Kaiser, D. H., Clement, T. S., Weaver, J. E., & Campbell, G. (2000). Presence/absence-sample matching by pigeons: divergent retention functions may result from the similarity of behavior during the absence sample and the retention interval. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 26(3), 294–304.
Abstract: Divergent choose-absence retention functions typically found in pigeons following presence/absence-sample matching have been attributed to the development of a single-code/default coding strategy. However, such effects may result from adventitious differential responding to the samples. In Experiment 1, retention functions were divergent only when differential sample responding could serve as the basis for comparison choice. In Experiment 2, when pecking did not occur during the retention interval, a choose-absence bias was found, but when pecking occurred during the retention interval, a choose-presence bias resulted. In Experiment 3, positive transfer was found when a stimulus associated with the absence of pecking replaced the absence sample but not when a stimulus associated with pecking replaced the presence sample. Thus, presence/absence-sample matching may not encourage the development of a single-code/default coding strategy in pigeons.
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Zentall, T. R., & Clement, T. S. (2002). Memory mechanisms in pigeons: evidence of base-rate neglect. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 28(1), 111–115.
Abstract: In delayed matching to sample, once acquired, pigeons presumably choose comparisons according to their memory for (the strength of) the sample. When memory for the sample is sufficiently weak, comparison choice should depend on the history of reinforcement associated with each of the comparison stimuli. In the present research, pigeons acquired two matching tasks in which Sample S1 was associated with one comparison from each task, C1 and C3, whereas Sample S2 was associated with Comparison C2, and Sample S3 was associated with Comparison C4. As the retention interval increased, the pigeons showed a bias to choose the comparison (C1 or C3) associated with the more frequently occurring sample (S1). Thus, pigeons were sensitive also to the (irrelevant) likelihood that each of the samples was presented. The results suggest that pigeons may allow their reference memory for the overall sample frequency to influence comparison choice, independent of the comparison stimuli present.
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Clement, T. S., & Zentall, T. R. (2002). Second-order contrast based on the expectation of effort and reinforcement. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 28(1), 64–74.
Abstract: Pigeons prefer signals for reinforcement that require greater effort (or time) to obtain over those that require less effort to obtain (T. S. Clement, J. Feltus, D. H. Kaiser, & T. R. Zentall, 2000). Preference was attributed to contrast (or to the relatively greater improvement in conditions) produced by the appearance of the signal when it was preceded by greater effort. In Experiment 1, the authors of the present study demonstrated that the expectation of greater effort was sufficient to produce such a preference (a second-order contrast effect). In Experiments 2 and 3, low versus high probability of reinforcement was substituted for high versus low effort, respectively, with similar results. In Experiment 3, the authors found that the stimulus preference could be attributed to positive contrast (when the discriminative stimuli represented an improvement in the probability of reinforcement) and perhaps also negative contrast (when the discriminative stimuli represented reduction in the probability of reinforcement).
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Kaiser, D. H., Zentall, T. R., & Neiman, E. (2002). Timing in pigeons: effects of the similarity between intertrial interval and gap in a timing signal. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 28(4), 416–422.
Abstract: Previous research suggests that when a fixed interval is interrupted (known as the gap procedure), pigeons tend to reset memory and start timing from 0 after the gap. However, because the ambient conditions of the gap typically have been the same as during the intertrial interval (ITI), ambiguity may have resulted. In the present experiment, the authors found that when ambient conditions during the gap were similar to the ITI, pigeons tended to reset memory, but when ambient conditions during the gap were different from the ITI, pigeons tended to stop timing, retain the duration of the stimulus in memory, and add to that time when the stimulus reappeared. Thus, when the gap was unambiguous, pigeons timed accurately.
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Zentall, T. R., Klein, E. D., & Singer, R. A. (2004). Evidence for detection of one duration sample and default responding to other duration samples by pigeons may result from an artifact of retention-test ambiguity. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 30(2), 129–134.
Abstract: S. C. Gaitan and J. T. Wixted (2000) proposed that when pigeons are trained on a conditional discrimination to associate 1 duration sample with 1 comparison and 2 other duration samples with a 2nd comparison, they detect only the single duration, and on trials involving either of the 2 other duration samples, they respond to the other comparison by default. In 2 experiments, the authors show instead that pigeons lend to treat the retention intervals (such as those used by Gaitan and Wixted) as intertrial intervals, and thus, they tend to treat all trials with a delay as 0-s sample trials. The authors tested this hypothesis by showing that divergent retention functions do not appear when the retention interval is discriminably different from the intertrial interval.
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Zentall, T. R., & Kaiser, D. H. (2005). Interval timing with gaps: gap ambiguity as an alternative to temporal decay. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 31(4), 484–486.
Abstract: C. V. Buhusi, D. Perera, and W. H. Meck (2005) proposed a hypothesis of timing in rats to account for the results of experiments that have used the peak procedure with gaps. According to this hypothesis, the introduction of a gap causes the animal's memory for the pregap interval to passively decay (subjectively shorten) in direct proportion to the duration and salience of the gap. Thus, animals should pause with short, nonsalient gaps but should reset their clock with longer, salient gaps. The present authors suggest that the ambiguity of the gap (i.e., the similarity between the gap and the intertrial interval in both appearance and relative duration) causes the animal to actively reset the clock and prevents adequate assessments of the fate of timed intervals prior to the gap. Furthermore, when the intertrial interval is discriminable from the gap, the evidence suggests that timed intervals prior to the gap are not lost but are retained in memory.
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