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Parr, L. A. (2004). Perceptual biases for multimodal cues in chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) affect recognition. Anim. Cogn., 7(3), 171–178.
Abstract: The ability of organisms to discriminate social signals, such as affective displays, using different sensory modalities is important for social communication. However, a major problem for understanding the evolution and integration of multimodal signals is determining how humans and animals attend to different sensory modalities, and these different modalities contribute to the perception and categorization of social signals. Using a matching-to-sample procedure, chimpanzees discriminated videos of conspecifics' facial expressions that contained only auditory or only visual cues by selecting one of two facial expression photographs that matched the expression category represented by the sample. Other videos were edited to contain incongruent sensory cues, i.e., visual features of one expression but auditory features of another. In these cases, subjects were free to select the expression that matched either the auditory or visual modality, whichever was more salient for that expression type. Results showed that chimpanzees were able to discriminate facial expressions using only auditory or visual cues, and when these modalities were mixed. However, in these latter trials, depending on the expression category, clear preferences for either the visual or auditory modality emerged. Pant-hoots and play faces were discriminated preferentially using the auditory modality, while screams were discriminated preferentially using the visual modality. Therefore, depending on the type of expressive display, the auditory and visual modalities were differentially salient in ways that appear consistent with the ethological importance of that display's social function.
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Bering, J. M. (2004). A critical review of the “enculturation hypothesis”: the effects of human rearing on great ape social cognition. Anim. Cogn., 7(4), 201–212.
Abstract: Numerous investigators have argued that early ontogenetic immersion in sociocultural environments facilitates cognitive developmental change in human-reared great apes more characteristic of Homo sapiens than of their own species. Such revamping of core, species-typical psychological systems might be manifest, according to this argument, in the emergence of mental representational competencies, a set of social cognitive skills theoretically consigned to humans alone. Human-reared great apes' capacity to engage in “true imitation,” in which both the means and ends of demonstrated actions are reproduced with fairly high rates of fidelity, and laboratory great apes' failure to do so, has frequently been interpreted as reflecting an emergent understanding of intentionality in the former. Although this epigenetic model of the effects of enculturation on social cognitive systems may be well-founded and theoretically justified in the biological literature, alternative models stressing behavioral as opposed to representational change have been largely overlooked. Here I review some of the controversy surrounding enculturation in great apes, and present an alternative nonmentalistic version of the enculturation hypothesis that can also account for enhanced imitative performance on object-oriented problem-solving tasks in human-reared animals.
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Cheng, K. (2004). K.J. Jeffery (ed) The neurobiology of spatial behaviourOxford University Press, Oxford, 2003. Anim. Cogn., .
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Izumi, A., & Kojima, S. (2004). Matching vocalizations to vocalizing faces in a chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes). Anim. Cogn., 7(3), 179–184.
Abstract: Auditory-visual processing of species-specific vocalizations was investigated in a female chimpanzee named Pan. The basic task was auditory-visual matching-to-sample, where Pan was required to choose the vocalizer from two test movies in response to a chimpanzee's vocalization. In experiment 1, movies of vocalizing and silent faces were paired as the test movies. The results revealed that Pan recognized the status of other chimpanzees whether they vocalized or not. In experiment 2, two different types of vocalizing faces of an identical individual were prepared as the test movies. Pan recognized the correspondence between vocalization types and faces. These results suggested that chimpanzees possess crossmodal representations of their vocalizations, as do humans. Together with the ability of vocal individual recognition, this ability might reflect chimpanzees' profound understanding of the status of other individuals.
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Cleveland, A., Rocca, A. M., Wendt, E. L., & Westergaard, G. C. (2004). Transport of tools to food sites in tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella). Anim. Cogn., 7(3), 193–198.
Abstract: Tool use and transport represent cognitively important aspects of early hominid evolution, and nonhuman primates are often used as models to examine the cognitive, ecological, morphological and social correlates of these behaviors in order to gain insights into the behavior of our early human ancestors. In 2001, Jalles-Filho et al. found that free-ranging capuchin monkeys failed to transport tools (stones) to food sites (nuts), but transported the foods to the tool sites. This result cast doubt on the usefulness of Cebus to model early human tool-using behavior. In this study, we examined the performance of six captive tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) in a tool transport task. Subjects were provided with the opportunity to transport two different tools to fixed food reward sites when the food reward was visible from the tool site and when the food reward was not visible from the tool site. We found that the subjects quickly and readily transported probing tools to an apparatus baited with syrup, but rarely transported stones to a nut-cracking apparatus. We suggest that the performance of the capuchins here reflects an efficient foraging strategy, in terms of energy return, among wild Cebus monkeys.
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Kaminski, J., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2004). Body orientation and face orientation: two factors controlling apes' behavior from humans. Anim. Cogn., 7(4), 216–223.
Abstract: A number of animal species have evolved the cognitive ability to detect when they are being watched by other individuals. Precisely what kind of information they use to make this determination is unknown. There is particular controversy in the case of the great apes because different studies report conflicting results. In experiment 1, we presented chimpanzees, orangutans, and bonobos with a situation in which they had to request food from a human observer who was in one of various attentional states. She either stared at the ape, faced the ape with her eyes closed, sat with her back towards the ape, or left the room. In experiment 2, we systematically crossed the observer's body and face orientation so that the observer could have her body and/or face oriented either towards or away from the subject. Results indicated that apes produced more behaviors when they were being watched. They did this not only on the basis of whether they could see the experimenter as a whole, but they were sensitive to her body and face orientation separately. These results suggest that body and face orientation encode two different types of information. Whereas face orientation encodes the observer's perceptual access, body orientation encodes the observer's disposition to transfer food. In contrast to the results on body and face orientation, only two of the tested subjects responded to the state of the observer's eyes.
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Pepperberg, I. M. (2004). “Insightful” string-pulling in Grey parrots (Psittacus erithacus) is affected by vocal competence. Anim. Cogn., 7(4), 263–266.
Abstract: Four Grey parrots (Psittacus erithacus) were tested on their ability to obtain an item suspended from a string such that mutiple, repeated, coordinated beak-foot actions were required for success (e.g., Heinrich 1995). Those birds with little training in referential English requests (e.g. “I want X”) succeeded, whereas birds who could request the suspended item failed to obtain the object but engaged in repeated requesting.
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Beran, M. J. (2004). Long-term retention of the differential values of Arabic numerals by chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Anim. Cogn., 7(2), 86–92.
Abstract: As previously reported (Beran and Rumbaugh, 2001), two chimpanzees used a joystick to collect dots, one-at-a-time, on a computer monitor, and then ended a trial when the number of dots collected was equal to the Arabic numeral presented for the trial. Here, the chimpanzees were presented with the task again after an interval of 6 months and then again after an additional interval of 3.25 years. During each interval, the chimpanzees were not presented with the task, and this allowed an assessment of the extent to which both animals retained the values of each Arabic numeral. Despite lower performance at each retention interval compared to the original study, both chimpanzees performed above chance levels in collecting a quantity of dots equal to the target numeral, one chimpanzee for the numerals 1-7, and the second chimpanzee for the numerals 1-6. For the 3.25-year retention, errors were more dispersed around each target numeral than in the original study, but the chimpanzees' performances again appeared to be based on a continuous representation of magnitude rather than a discrete representation of number. These data provide an experimental demonstration of long-term retention of the differential values of Arabic numerals by chimpanzees.
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Schwartz, B. L., Meissner, C. A., Hoffman, M., Evans, S., & Frazier, L. D. (2004). Event memory and misinformation effects in a gorilla (Gorilla gorilla gorilla). Anim. Cogn., 7(2), 93–100.
Abstract: Event memory and misinformation effects were examined in an adult male gorilla ( Gorilla gorilla gorilla). The gorilla witnessed a series of unique events, involving a familiar person engaging in a novel behavior (experiment 1), a novel person engaging in a novel behavior (experiment 2), or the presentation of a novel object (experiment 3). Following a 5- to 10-min retention interval, a tester gave the gorilla three photographs mounted on wooden cards: a photograph depicting the correct person or object and two distractor photographs drawn from the same class. The gorilla responded by returning a photograph. If correct, he was reinforced with food. Across three experiments, the gorilla performed significantly above chance at recognizing the target photograph. In experiment 4, the gorilla showed at-chance performance when the event was followed by misinformation (a class-consistent, but incorrect photograph), but significantly above-chance performance when no misinformation occurred (either correct photograph or no photograph). Although the familiarity can account for these data, they are also consistent with an episodic-memory interpretation.
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Fortes, A. F., Merchant, H., & Georgopoulos, A. P. (2004). Comparative and categorical spatial judgments in the monkey: “high” and “low”. Anim. Cogn., 7(2), 101–108.
Abstract: Adult human subjects can classify the height of an object as belonging to either of the “high” or “low” categories by utilizing an abstract concept of midline that divides the vertical dimension into two halves. Children lack this abstract concept of midline, do not have a sense that these categories are directional opposites, and their categorical and comparative usages of high(er) or low(er) are restricted to the corresponding poles. We investigated the abilities of a rhesus monkey to perform categorical judgments in space. We were also interested in the presence of the congruity effect (a decrease in response time when the objects compared are closer to the category pole) in the monkey. The presence of this phenomenon in the monkey would allow us to relate the behavior of the animal to the two major competing hypotheses that have been suggested to explain the congruity effect in humans: the analog and semantic models. The monkey was trained in delayed match-to-sample tasks in which it had to categorize objects as belonging to either a high or low category. The monkey was able to generate an abstract notion of midline in a fashion similar to that of adult human subjects. The congruity effect was also present in the monkey. These findings, taken together with the notion that monkeys are not considered to think in propositional terms, may favor an analog comparison model in the monkey.
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