Abstract: The evolution of cooperation requires either (a) nonrandom interactions, such that cooperators preferentially interact with other cooperators, or (b) conditional behaviors, such that individuals act cooperatively primarily towards other cooperators. Although these conditions can be met without assuming sophisticated animal cognition, they are more likely to be met if animals can remember individuals with whom they have interacted, associate past interactions with these individuals, and base future behavior on this information. Here we show that guppies (Poecilia reticulata), in the context of predator inspection behavior, can identify and remember (for at least 4 h) the “more cooperative” among two conspecifics and subsequently choose to be near these individuals in future encounters.

Abstract: Alliances among kin play a major role in a female's acquisition of her mother's dominance rank in many species of cercopithecines. It is noteworthy, however, that kin rarely form coalitions to challenge females from higher-ranking matrilines, and that matrilineal hierarchies are remarkably stable. One possible reason for the rarity of destabilizing coalitions is that members of high-ranking matrilines form alliances against lower ranking ones. In this paper the patterning of aggressive support among non-kin, and its effect on the stability of rank relations are analysed in a captive group of Japanese macaques, Macaca fuscata, composed of three unrelated matrilines. Analysis of the distribution of non-kin interventions in conflicts between matrilines over a 52-month period revealed a clear pattern of preferential support between the two dominant matrilines against the third-ranking one. This pattern was confirmed experimentally. Any member of the two dominant matrilines was unable, individually, to maintain its rank above the third-ranking matriline, but was able to do so in the presence of the other dominant matriline. Non-kin alliances appear to prevent subordinate females from challenging higher ranking females through revolutionary coalitions (formed among subordinates) or through bridging coalitions (formed among individuals ranking above and below the target). Non-kin support is interpreted in terms of cooperation versus reciprocal altruism.

Abstract: Animal cognition is a field within experimental psychology in which cognitive processes formerly studied exclusively with people have been demonstrated in animals. Evidence for imagery in the pigeon emerges from the experiments described here. The pigeon's task was to discriminate, by pecking the appropriate choice key, between a clock hand presented on a video screen that rotated clockwise with constant velocity from a clock hand that violated constant velocity. Imagery was defined by trials on which the line rotated from 12.00 o'clock to 3.00 o'clock, then disappeared during a delay, and reappeared at a final stop location beyond 3.00 o'clock. After acquisition of a discrimination with final stop locations at 3.00 o'clock and 6.00 o'clock, the evidence for imagery was the accurate responding of the pigeons to novel locations at 4.00 o'clock and 7.00 o'clock. Pigeons display evidence of imagery by transforming a representation of movement that includes a series of intermediate steps which accurately represent the location of a moving stimulus after it disappears.

Abstract: In general, codes that have been designed to safeguard the welfare of animals emphasize the importance of providing an environment that will ensure good health and a normal physiological and physical state, that is, they emphasize the animals' physical needs. If mental needs are mentioned, they are always relegated to secondary importance. The argument is put forward here that animal welfare is dependent solely on the cognitive needs of the animals concerned. In general, if these cognitive needs are met, they will protect the animals' physical needs. It is contended that in the few cases in which they do not safeguard the physical needs, it does not matter from a welfare point of view. The human example is given of being ill. It is argued that welfare is only adversely affected when a person feels ill, knows that he or she is ill, or even thinks that he or she is ill, all of which processes are cognitive ones. The implications for welfare of animals possessing certain cognitive abilities are discussed. For example, the extent to which animals are aware of their internal state while performing behavior known to be indicative of so-called states of suffering, such as fear, frustration, and pain, will determine how much they are actually suffering. With careful experimentation it may be possible to determine how negative they feel these states to be. Similarly, the extent to which animals think about items or events absent from their immediate environment will determine how frustrated they are in the absence of the real item or event but in the presence of the cognitive representation.