Abstract: Fourteen juvenile and adult orangutans and 24 3- and 4-yr-old children participated in 4 studies on imitative learning in a problem-solving situation. In all studies a simple to operate apparatus was used, but its internal mechanism was hidden from subjects to prevent individual learning. In the 1st study, orangutans observed a human demonstrator perform 1 of 4 actions on the apparatus and obtain a reward; they subsequently showed no signs of imitative learning. Similar results were obtained in a 2nd study in which orangutan demonstrators were used. Similar results were also obtained in a 3rd study in which a human encouraged imitation from an orangutan that had previously been taught to mimic arbitrary human actions. In a 4th study, human 3- and 4-yr-old children learned the task by means of imitation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)

Abstract: Abstract Recent studies have suggested that domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) engage in highly complex forms of social learning. Here, we critically assess the potential mechanisms underlying social learning in dogs using two problem-solving tasks. In a classical detour task, the test dogs benefited from observing a demonstrator walking around a fence to obtain a reward. However, even inexperienced dogs did not show a preference for passing the fence at the same end as the demonstrator. Furthermore, dogs did not need to observe a complete demonstration by a human demonstrator to pass the task. Instead, they were just as successful in solving the problem after seeing a partial demonstration by an object passing by at the end of the fence. In contrast to earlier findings, our results suggest that stimulus enhancement (or affordance learning) might be a powerful social learning mechanism used by dogs to solve such detour problems. In the second task, we examined whether naïve dogs copy actions to solve an instrumental problem. After controlling for stimulus enhancement and other forms of social influence (e.g. social facilitation and observational conditioning), we found that dogs’ problem solving was not influenced by witnessing a skilful demonstrator (either an unknown human, a conspecific or the dog’s owner). Together, these results add to evidence suggesting that social learning may often be explained by relatively simple (but powerful) mechanisms.

Abstract: Previous studies have shown that dogs have developed a special sensitivity to the communicative signals and attentional states of humans. The aim of the current study was to further investigate what dogs know about the visual perception of humans and themselves. In the first two experiments we investigated whether dogs were sensitive to the properties of barriers as blocking the visual access of humans. We presented dogs with a situation in which a human forbade them to take a piece of food, but the type and orientation of the barrier allowed the dog to take the food undetected in some conditions. Dogs differentiated between effective and ineffective barriers, based on their orientation or the particular features of the barriers such as size or the presence of window. In the third study we investigated whether dogs know about what they themselves have seen. We presented subjects with two boxes and placed food in one of them. In the Seen condition the location of the food was shown to the dogs while in the Unseen condition dogs were prevented from seeing the destination of the food. Before selecting one of the boxes by pressing a lever, dogs had the opportunity to seek extra information regarding the contents of the boxes, which would be particularly useful in the condition in which they had not seen where the food was hidden. Dogs rarely used the opportunity to seek information about the contents of the box before making their choice in any condition. Therefore, we found no evidence suggesting that dogs have access to what they themselves have seen, which contrasts with the positive evidence about visual perspective taking in others from the first two experiments and previous studies.

Abstract: Description
Ever since Charles Darwin first formulated his theories on evolution, much research has been conducted in primate cognition. In this book, Michael Tomasello and Josep Call review what is already known about the cognitive skills of nonhuman primates, and assess the current state of our knowledge. They integrate empirical findings on the topic from the beginning of the century to the present, placing this work in theoretical perspective. The first part examines the way primates adapt to their physical world, mostly for the purpose of foraging. The second part lokos at primate social knowledhe and focuses on the adaptations of primates to their social world for purposes of competation and cooperation. In the third section, the authors construct a general theory of primate cognition, distinguishing the cognition in primates from that of other mammals (human in particular). Their broad-ranging theory should provide a guide for future research. Primate Cognition is an enlightening exploration of the cognitive capacities of our nearest primate relatives. It is a useful resource for a eide range of researchers and students in psychology, behavioral biology, primatology, and anthropology.