Abstract: ABSTRACT Reciprocity is probably the most debated of the evolutionary explanations for cooperation. Part of the confusion surrounding this debate stems from a failure to note that two different processes can result in reciprocity: partner control and partner choice. We suggest that the common observation that group-living animals direct their cooperative behaviours preferentially to those individuals from which they receive most cooperation is to be interpreted as the result of the sum of the two separate processes of partner control and partner choice. We review evidence that partner choice is the prevalent process in primates and propose explanations for this pattern. We make predictions that highlight the need for studies that separate the effects of partner control and partner choice in a broader variety of group-living taxa.

Abstract: Dogs are known to consistently follow human pointing gestures. In this study, we asked whether dogs “automatically” do this or whether they flexibly adjust their behavior depending upon the reliability of the pointer, demonstrated in an immediately preceding event. We tested pet dogs in a version of the object choice task in which a piece of food was hidden in one of the two containers. In Experiment 1, Phase 1, an experimenter pointed at the baited container; the second container was empty. In Phase 2, after showing the contents of both containers to the dogs, the experimenter pointed at the empty container. In Phase 3, the procedure was exactly as in Phase 1. We compared the dogs’ responses to the experimenter’s pointing gestures in Phases 1 and 3. Most dogs followed pointing in Phase 1, but many fewer did so in Phase 3. In Experiment 2, dogs followed a new experimenter’s pointing in Phase 3 following replication of procedures of Phases 1 and 2 in Experiment 1. This ruled out the possibility that dogs simply lost motivation to participate in the task in later phases. These results suggest that not only dogs are highly skilled at understanding human pointing gestures, but also they make inferences about the reliability of a human who presents cues and consequently modify their behavior flexibly depending on the inference.

Abstract: Operant conditioning and two choice preference tests were used to assess the motivation of horses to be released from straight and from box stalls. The motivations for food, a companion, and release into a paddock were compared when the horses had to work for each commodity at increasing fixed ratios of responses (panel presses) to reward in an equine operant conditioning stall. The motivation for food (mean ± SEM = 258 ± 143) responses was much greater than that for either release (38 ± 32) from a straight stall into a large paddock alone or into a small paddock with another horse (95 ± 41) (P = 0.04). When given a two choice preference test between exercise on a treadmill for 20 min or returning to their box stalls, eight of nine horses chose to return to their stalls. In a two choice preference test six of eight horses in box stalls chose to be released into a paddock alone. Horses were given a series of two choice preference tests to determine how long they preferred to be in a paddock. After 15 min in the paddock the horses were re-tested, but all chose the paddock when released into a paddock with three other horses. They were retested every 15 min until they chose to return to their stalls. They chose to stay out for 35 ± 6 min when other horses were in the paddock but for only 17 ± 2 min when they would be alone. When deprived of stall release for 48 h the horses chose to remain in the paddock with other horses for 54 ± 6 min, but showed no compensatory behavior when they were alone (duration chosen = 16 ± 4 min). These findings indicate that horses are not strongly motivated to exercise alone and will choose not to endure forced exercise on a treadmill. The social context of voluntary exercise is important; horses are willing to stay out of their stalls longer if other horses are present and will show compensatory behavior only if other horses are present. These finding have implications for optimizing turnout time for stalled horses.

Abstract: Self‐organizing‐system approaches have shed significant light on the mechanisms underlying synchronized movements by large groups of animals, such as shoals of fish, flocks of birds, or herds of ungulates. However, these approaches rarely consider conflicts of interest between group members, although there is reason to suppose that such conflicts are commonplace. Here, we demonstrate that, where conflicts exist, individual members of self‐organizing groups can, in principle, increase their influence on group movement destination by strategically changing simple behavioral parameters (namely, movement speed, assertiveness, and social attraction range). However, they do so at the expense of an increased risk of group fragmentation and a decrease in movement efficiency. We argue that the resulting trade‐offs faced by each group member render it likely that group movements are led by those members for which reaching a particular destination is most crucial or group cohesion is least important. We term this phenomenon leading according to “need” or “social indifference,” respectively. Both kinds of leading can occur in the absence of knowledge of or communication about the needs of other group members and without the assumption of altruistic cooperation. We discuss our findings in the light of observations on fish and other vertebrates.

Abstract: A group of animals can only move cohesively, if group members “somehow” reach a consensus about the timing (e.g., start) and the spatial direction/destination of the collective movement. Timing and spatial decisions usually differ with respect to the continuity of their cost/benefit distribution in such a way that, in principle, compromises are much more feasible in timing decision (e.g. median preferred time) than they are in spatial decisions. The consequence is that consensus costs connected to collective timing decisions are usually less skewed amongst group members than are consensus costs connected to spatial decisions. This, in turn, influences the evolution of decision sharing: sharing in timing decisions is most likely to evolve when conflicts are high relative to group cohesion benefits, while sharing in spatial decisions is most likely to evolve in the opposite situation. We discuss the implications of these differences for the study of collective movement decisions.