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Chase, I. D., Tovey, C., Spangler-Martin, D., & Manfredonia, M. (2002). Individual differences versus social dynamics in the formation of animal dominance hierarchies. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 99(8), 5744–5749.
Abstract: Linear hierarchies, the classical pecking-order structures, are formed readily in both nature and the laboratory in a great range of species including humans. However, the probability of getting linear structures by chance alone is quite low. In this paper we investigate the two hypotheses that are proposed most often to explain linear hierarchies: they are predetermined by differences in the attributes of animals, or they are produced by the dynamics of social interaction, i.e., they are self-organizing. We evaluate these hypotheses using cichlid fish as model animals, and although differences in attributes play a significant part, we find that social interaction is necessary for high proportions of groups with linear hierarchies. Our results suggest that dominance hierarchy formation is a much richer and more complex phenomenon than previously thought, and we explore the implications of these results for evolutionary biology, the social sciences, and the use of animal models in understanding human social organization.
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Broom, M. (2002). A unified model of dominance hierarchy formation and maintenance. J. Theor. Biol., 219(1), 63–72.
Abstract: In many different species it is common for animals to spend large portions of their lives in groups. Such groups need to divide available resources amongst the individuals they contain and this is often achieved by means of a dominance hierarchy. Sometimes hierarchies are stable over a long period of time and new individuals slot into pre-determined positions, but there are many situations where this is not so and a hierarchy is formed out of a group of individuals meeting for the first time. There are several different models both of the formation of such dominance hierarchies and of already existing hierarchies. These models often treat the two phases as entirely separate, whereas in reality, if there is a genuine formation phase to the hierarchy, behaviour in this phase will be governed by the rewards available, which in turn depends upon how the hierarchy operates once it has been formed. This paper describes a method of unifying models of these two distinct phases, assuming that the hierarchy formed is stable. In particular a framework is introduced which allows a variety of different models of each of the two parts to be used in conjunction with each other, thus enabling a wide range of situations to be modelled. Some examples are given to show how this works in practice.
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Plotnik, J. M., de Waal, F. B. M., & Reiss, D. (2006). Self-recognition in an Asian elephant. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 103(45), 17053–17057.
Abstract: Considered an indicator of self-awareness, mirror self-recognition (MSR) has long seemed limited to humans and apes. In both phylogeny and human ontogeny, MSR is thought to correlate with higher forms of empathy and altruistic behavior. Apart from humans and apes, dolphins and elephants are also known for such capacities. After the recent discovery of MSR in dolphins (Tursiops truncatus), elephants thus were the next logical candidate species. We exposed three Asian elephants (Elephas maximus) to a large mirror to investigate their responses. Animals that possess MSR typically progress through four stages of behavior when facing a mirror: (i) social responses, (ii) physical inspection (e.g., looking behind the mirror), (iii) repetitive mirror-testing behavior, and (iv) realization of seeing themselves. Visible marks and invisible sham-marks were applied to the elephants' heads to test whether they would pass the litmus “mark test” for MSR in which an individual spontaneously uses a mirror to touch an otherwise imperceptible mark on its own body. Here, we report a successful MSR elephant study and report striking parallels in the progression of responses to mirrors among apes, dolphins, and elephants. These parallels suggest convergent cognitive evolution most likely related to complex sociality and cooperation.
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Mrosovsky, N., & Shettleworth, S. J. (1968). Wavelength preferences and brightness cues in the water finding behaviour of sea turtles. Behaviour, 32(4), 211–257.
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Shettleworth, S. J. (1978). Reinforcement and the organization of behavior in golden hamsters: Pavlovian conditioning with food and shock unconditioned stimuli. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 4(2), 152–169.
Abstract: The effects of Pavlovian conditioned stimuli (CSs) for food or shock on a variety of behaviors of golden hamsters were observed in three experiments. The aim was to see whether previously reported differences among the behaviors produced by food reinforcement and punishment procedures could be accounted for by differential effects of Pavlovian conditioning on the behaviors. There was some correspondence between the behaviors observed to the CSs and the previously reported effects of instrumental training. However, the Pavlovian conditioned responses (CRs) alone would not have predicted the effects of instrumental training. Moreover, CRs depended to some extent on the context in which training and testing occurred. These findings, together with others in the literature, suggest that the results of Pavlovian conditioning procedures may not unambiguously predict what system of behaviors will be most readily modified by instrumental training with a given reinforcer.
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Shettleworth, S. J. (2005). Taking the best for learning. Behav. Process., 69(2), 147–9; author reply 159–63.
Abstract: Examples of how animals learn when multiple, sometimes redundant, cues are present provide further examples not considered by Hutchinson and Gigerenzer that seem to fit the principle of taking the best. “The best” may the most valid cue in the present circumstances; evolution may also produce species-specific biases to use the most functionally relevant cues.
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Zentall, T. R., Kaiser, D. H., Clement, T. S., Weaver, J. E., & Campbell, G. (2000). Presence/absence-sample matching by pigeons: divergent retention functions may result from the similarity of behavior during the absence sample and the retention interval. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 26(3), 294–304.
Abstract: Divergent choose-absence retention functions typically found in pigeons following presence/absence-sample matching have been attributed to the development of a single-code/default coding strategy. However, such effects may result from adventitious differential responding to the samples. In Experiment 1, retention functions were divergent only when differential sample responding could serve as the basis for comparison choice. In Experiment 2, when pecking did not occur during the retention interval, a choose-absence bias was found, but when pecking occurred during the retention interval, a choose-presence bias resulted. In Experiment 3, positive transfer was found when a stimulus associated with the absence of pecking replaced the absence sample but not when a stimulus associated with pecking replaced the presence sample. Thus, presence/absence-sample matching may not encourage the development of a single-code/default coding strategy in pigeons.
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Dorrance, B. R., & Zentall, T. R. (2001). Imitative learning in Japanese quail (Coturnix japonica) depends on the motivational state of the observer quail at the time of observation. J Comp Psychol, 115(1), 62–67.
Abstract: The 2-action method was used to examine whether imitative learning in Japanese quail (Coturnix japonica) depends on the motivational state of the observer quail at the time of observation of the demonstrated behavior. Two groups of observers were fed before observation (satiated groups), whereas 2 other groups of observers were deprived of food before observation (hungry groups). Quail were tested either immediately following observation or after a 30-min delay. Results indicated that quail in the hungry groups imitated, whereas those in the satiated groups did not, regardless of whether their test was immediate or delayed. The results suggest that observer quail may not learn (through observation) behavior that leads to a reinforcer for which they are unmotivated at the time of test. In addition, the results show that quail are able to delay the performance of a response acquired through observation (i.e., they show deferred imitation).
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Klein, E. D., & Zentall, T. R. (2003). Imitation and affordance learning by pigeons (Columba livia). J Comp Psychol, 117(4), 414–419.
Abstract: The bidirectional control procedure was used to determine whether pigeons (Columba livia) would imitate a demonstrator that pushed a sliding screen for food. One group of observers saw a trained demonstrator push a sliding screen door with its beak (imitation group), whereas 2 other groups watched the screen move independently (possibly learning how the environment works) with a conspecific either present (affordance learning with social facilitation) or absent (affordance learning alone). A 4th group could not see the screen being pushed (sound and odor control). Imitation was evidenced by the finding that pigeons that saw a demonstrator push the screen made a higher proportion of matching screen pushes than observers in 2 appropriate control conditions. Further, observers that watched a screen move without a demonstrator present made a significantly higher proportion of matching screen pushes than would be expected by chance. Thus, these pigeons were capable of affordance learning.
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Zentall, T. R. (2006). Imitation: definitions, evidence, and mechanisms. Anim. Cogn., 9(4), 335–353.
Abstract: Imitation can be defined as the copying of behavior. To a biologist, interest in imitation is focused on its adaptive value for the survival of the organism, but to a psychologist, the mechanisms responsible for imitation are the most interesting. For psychologists, the most important cases of imitation are those that involve demonstrated behavior that the imitator cannot see when it performs the behavior (e.g., scratching one's head). Such examples of imitation are sometimes referred to as opaque imitation because they are difficult to account for without positing cognitive mechanisms, such as perspective taking, that most animals have not been acknowledged to have. The present review first identifies various forms of social influence and social learning that do not qualify as opaque imitation, including species-typical mechanisms (e.g., mimicry and contagion), motivational mechanisms (e.g., social facilitation, incentive motivation, transfer of fear), attentional mechanisms (e.g., local enhancement, stimulus enhancement), imprinting, following, observational conditioning, and learning how the environment works (affordance learning). It then presents evidence for different forms of opaque imitation in animals, and identifies characteristics of human imitation that have been proposed to distinguish it from animal imitation. Finally, it examines the role played in opaque imitation by demonstrator reinforcement and observer motivation. Although accounts of imitation have been proposed that vary in their level of analysis from neural to cognitive, at present no theory of imitation appears to be adequate to account for the varied results that have been found.
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