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Cleveland, A., Rocca, A. M., Wendt, E. L., & Westergaard, G. C. (2004). Transport of tools to food sites in tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella). Anim. Cogn., 7(3), 193–198.
Abstract: Tool use and transport represent cognitively important aspects of early hominid evolution, and nonhuman primates are often used as models to examine the cognitive, ecological, morphological and social correlates of these behaviors in order to gain insights into the behavior of our early human ancestors. In 2001, Jalles-Filho et al. found that free-ranging capuchin monkeys failed to transport tools (stones) to food sites (nuts), but transported the foods to the tool sites. This result cast doubt on the usefulness of Cebus to model early human tool-using behavior. In this study, we examined the performance of six captive tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) in a tool transport task. Subjects were provided with the opportunity to transport two different tools to fixed food reward sites when the food reward was visible from the tool site and when the food reward was not visible from the tool site. We found that the subjects quickly and readily transported probing tools to an apparatus baited with syrup, but rarely transported stones to a nut-cracking apparatus. We suggest that the performance of the capuchins here reflects an efficient foraging strategy, in terms of energy return, among wild Cebus monkeys.
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Kaminski, J., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2004). Body orientation and face orientation: two factors controlling apes' behavior from humans. Anim. Cogn., 7(4), 216–223.
Abstract: A number of animal species have evolved the cognitive ability to detect when they are being watched by other individuals. Precisely what kind of information they use to make this determination is unknown. There is particular controversy in the case of the great apes because different studies report conflicting results. In experiment 1, we presented chimpanzees, orangutans, and bonobos with a situation in which they had to request food from a human observer who was in one of various attentional states. She either stared at the ape, faced the ape with her eyes closed, sat with her back towards the ape, or left the room. In experiment 2, we systematically crossed the observer's body and face orientation so that the observer could have her body and/or face oriented either towards or away from the subject. Results indicated that apes produced more behaviors when they were being watched. They did this not only on the basis of whether they could see the experimenter as a whole, but they were sensitive to her body and face orientation separately. These results suggest that body and face orientation encode two different types of information. Whereas face orientation encodes the observer's perceptual access, body orientation encodes the observer's disposition to transfer food. In contrast to the results on body and face orientation, only two of the tested subjects responded to the state of the observer's eyes.
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Beran, M. J. (2004). Long-term retention of the differential values of Arabic numerals by chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Anim. Cogn., 7(2), 86–92.
Abstract: As previously reported (Beran and Rumbaugh, 2001), two chimpanzees used a joystick to collect dots, one-at-a-time, on a computer monitor, and then ended a trial when the number of dots collected was equal to the Arabic numeral presented for the trial. Here, the chimpanzees were presented with the task again after an interval of 6 months and then again after an additional interval of 3.25 years. During each interval, the chimpanzees were not presented with the task, and this allowed an assessment of the extent to which both animals retained the values of each Arabic numeral. Despite lower performance at each retention interval compared to the original study, both chimpanzees performed above chance levels in collecting a quantity of dots equal to the target numeral, one chimpanzee for the numerals 1-7, and the second chimpanzee for the numerals 1-6. For the 3.25-year retention, errors were more dispersed around each target numeral than in the original study, but the chimpanzees' performances again appeared to be based on a continuous representation of magnitude rather than a discrete representation of number. These data provide an experimental demonstration of long-term retention of the differential values of Arabic numerals by chimpanzees.
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Schwartz, B. L., Meissner, C. A., Hoffman, M., Evans, S., & Frazier, L. D. (2004). Event memory and misinformation effects in a gorilla (Gorilla gorilla gorilla). Anim. Cogn., 7(2), 93–100.
Abstract: Event memory and misinformation effects were examined in an adult male gorilla ( Gorilla gorilla gorilla). The gorilla witnessed a series of unique events, involving a familiar person engaging in a novel behavior (experiment 1), a novel person engaging in a novel behavior (experiment 2), or the presentation of a novel object (experiment 3). Following a 5- to 10-min retention interval, a tester gave the gorilla three photographs mounted on wooden cards: a photograph depicting the correct person or object and two distractor photographs drawn from the same class. The gorilla responded by returning a photograph. If correct, he was reinforced with food. Across three experiments, the gorilla performed significantly above chance at recognizing the target photograph. In experiment 4, the gorilla showed at-chance performance when the event was followed by misinformation (a class-consistent, but incorrect photograph), but significantly above-chance performance when no misinformation occurred (either correct photograph or no photograph). Although the familiarity can account for these data, they are also consistent with an episodic-memory interpretation.
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Hampton, R. R., Zivin, A., & Murray, E. A. (2004). Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) discriminate between knowing and not knowing and collect information as needed before acting. Anim. Cogn., 7(4), 239–246.
Abstract: Humans use memory awareness to determine whether relevant knowledge is available before acting, as when we determine whether we know a phone number before dialing. Such metacognition, or thinking about thinking, can improve selection of appropriate behavior. We investigated whether rhesus monkeys ( Macaca mulatta) are capable of a simple form of metacognitive access to the contents of short-term memory. Monkeys chose among four opaque tubes, one of which concealed food. The tube containing the reward varied randomly from trial to trial. On half the trials the monkeys observed the experimenter baiting the tube, whereas on the remaining trials their view of the baiting was blocked. On each trial, monkeys were allowed a single chance to select the tube containing the reward. During the choice period the monkeys had the opportunity to look down the length of each tube, to determine if it contained food. When they knew the location of the reward, most monkeys chose without looking. In contrast, when ignorant, monkeys often made the effort required to look, thereby learning the location of the reward before choosing. Looking improved accuracy on trials on which monkeys had not observed the baiting. The difference in looking behavior between trials on which the monkeys knew, and trials on which they were ignorant, suggests that rhesus monkeys discriminate between knowing and not knowing. This result extends similar observations made of children and apes to a species of Old World monkey, suggesting that the underlying cognitive capacities may be widely distributed among primates.
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Evans, T. A., & Westergaard, G. C. (2004). Discrimination of functionally appropriate and inappropriate throwing tools by captive tufted capuchins (Cebus apella). Anim. Cogn., 7(4), 255–262.
Abstract: A tool-throwing task was used to test whether capuchin monkeys understand the difference between functionally appropriate and functionally inappropriate tools. A group of monkeys was trained to obtain a sticky treat from a container outside their enclosure using a projectile attached to one end of an anchored line. Subsequently, these monkeys were given choice tests between functional and nonfunctional versions of tools used in training. A different feature of the tool was varied between alternatives in each choice test. The monkeys chose to use functional tools significantly more often than nonfunctional tools in early exposures to each choice test. A second experiment tested whether these subjects, as well as a second group of minimally trained participants, could distinguish between functional and nonfunctional tools that appeared different from those used in training. A new set of design features was varied between tools in these choice tests. All participants continued to choose functional tools significantly more often than nonfunctional tools, regardless of their tool-throwing experience or the novel appearance of the tools. These results suggest that capuchin monkeys, like chimpanzees studied in similar experiments, are sensitive to a variety of functionally relevant tool features.
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Tomasello, M., & Call, J. (2004). The role of humans in the cognitive development of apes revisited. Anim. Cogn., 7(4), 213–215.
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Nielsen, M., Collier-Baker, E., Davis, J. M., & Suddendorf, T. (2005). Imitation recognition in a captive chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes). Anim. Cogn., 8(1), 31–36.
Abstract: This study investigated the ability of a captive chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) to recognise when he is being imitated. In the experimental condition of test 1a, an experimenter imitated the postures and behaviours of the chimpanzee as they were being displayed. In three control conditions the same experimenter exhibited (1) actions that were contingent on, but different from, the actions of the chimpanzee, (2) actions that were not contingent on, and different from, the actions of the chimpanzee, or (3) no action at all. The chimpanzee showed more “testing” sequences (i.e., systematically varying his actions while oriented to the imitating experimenter) and more repetitive behaviour when he was being imitated, than when he was not. This finding was replicated 4 months later in test 1b. When the experimenter repeated the same actions she displayed in the experimental condition of test 1a back to the chimpanzee in test 2, these actions now did not elicit those same testing sequences or repetitive behaviours. However, a live imitation condition did. Together these results provide the first evidence of imitation recognition in a nonhuman animal.
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O'Connell, S., & Dunbar, R. I. M. (2005). The perception of causality in chimpanzees (Pan spp.). Anim. Cogn., 8(1), 60–66.
Abstract: Chimpanzees (Pan spp.) were tested on a habituation/dishabituation paradigm that was originally developed to test for comprehension of causality in very young human infants. Three versions of the test were used: a food item being moved by a hand, a human pushing another human off a chair to obtain a food item, and a film clip of natural chimpanzee behaviour (capturing and eating a monkey). Chimpanzees exhibited similar results to those obtained with human infants, with significantly elevated levels of looking on the dishabituation trials. Since the level of response was significantly greater on natural/unnatural sequences than on unnatural/natural sequences, we conclude that the chimpanzees were not responding just to novelty but rather to events that infringed their sense of natural causation.
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Osthaus, B., Lea, S. E. G., & Slater, A. M. (2005). Dogs (Canis lupus familiaris) fail to show understanding of means-end connections in a string-pulling task. Anim. Cogn., 8(1), 37–47.
Abstract: Domestic dogs (Canis lupus familiaris) were tested in four experiments for their understanding of means-end connections. In each of the experiments, the dogs attempted to retrieve a food treat that could be seen behind a barrier and which was connected, via string, to a within-reach wooden block. In the experiments, either one or two strings were present, but the treat was attached only to one string. Successful retrieval of the treat required the animals to pull the appropriate string (either by pawing or by grasping the wooden block in their jaws) until the treat emerged from under the barrier. The results showed that the dogs were successful if the treat was in a perpendicular line to the barrier, i.e. straight ahead, but not when the string was at an angle: in the latter condition, the typical response was a proximity error in that the dogs pawed or mouthed at a location closest in line to the treat. When two strings that crossed were present, the dogs tended to pull on the wrong string. The combined results from the experiments show that, although dogs can learn to pull on a string to obtain food, they do not spontaneously understand means-end connections involving strings.
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