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Gould, J. L. (2004). Animal cognition. Curr Biol, 14(10), R372–5.
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Hart, D., & Whitlow, J. W. J. (1995). The experience of self in the bottlenose dolphin. Conscious Cogn, 4(2), 244–247.
Abstract: Marten and Psarakos have presented some evidence which suggests that objective self-awareness and possibly representations of self may characterize the dolphins' experience of self. Their research demonstrates the possibility of similarities in the sense of self between primate species and dolphins, although whether dolphins have subjective self-awareness, personal memories, and theories of self--all important facets of the sense of self in humans--was not examined. Clearly, even this limited evidence was difficult to achieve; the difficulties in adapting methods and coding behavior are quite apparent in their report. Future progress, however, may depend upon clarification of what are the necessary components for a sense of self and an explication of how these might be reflected in dolphin behavior. We are mindful of the authors' point (pp. 219 and 220) that the dolphin lives more in an acoustic than a visual environment. Thus, while tasks relying upon vision may reveal the presence or absence of the sense of self in primates, it might well be the case that in dolphins self-related experiences might be better revealed in auditory tasks. But then, what is the nature of human self-awareness in terms of audition? While both conceptual and methodological hurdles remain, Marten and Psarakos have demonstrated that important questions can be asked about the minds and phenomenal worlds of nonanthropoid species.
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Loveland, K. A. (1995). Self-recognition in the bottlenose dolphin: ecological considerations. Conscious Cogn, 4(2), 254–257.
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Parker, S. T. (1997). A general model for the adaptive function of self-knowledge in animals and humans. Conscious Cogn, 6(1), 75–86.
Abstract: This article offers a general definition of self-knowledge that embraces all forms and levels of self-knowledge in animals and humans. It is hypothesized that various levels of self-knowledge constitute an ordinal scale such that each species in a lineage displays the forms of self-knowledge found in related species as well as new forms it and its sister species may have evolved. Likewise, it is hypothesized that these various forms of levels of self-knowledge develop in the sequence in which they evolved. Finally, a general hypothesis for the functional significance of self-knowledge is proposed along with subhypotheses regarding the adaptive significance of various levels of self-knowledge in mammals including human and nonhuman primates. The general hypothesis is that self-knowledge serves as a standard for assessing the qualities of conspecifics compared to those of the self. Such assessment is crucial to deciding among alternative reproductive and subsistence strategies. The qualities that are assessed, which vary across taxa, range from the size and strength of the self to its mathematical or musical abilities. This so-called assessment model of self-knowledge is based on evolutionary biological models for social selection and the role of assessment in animal communication.
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Panksepp, J. (2005). Affective consciousness: Core emotional feelings in animals and humans. Conscious Cogn, 14(1), 30–80.
Abstract: The position advanced in this paper is that the bedrock of emotional feelings is contained within the evolved emotional action apparatus of mammalian brains. This dual-aspect monism approach to brain-mind functions, which asserts that emotional feelings may reflect the neurodynamics of brain systems that generate instinctual emotional behaviors, saves us from various conceptual conundrums. In coarse form, primary process affective consciousness seems to be fundamentally an unconditional “gift of nature” rather than an acquired skill, even though those systems facilitate skill acquisition via various felt reinforcements. Affective consciousness, being a comparatively intrinsic function of the brain, shared homologously by all mammalian species, should be the easiest variant of consciousness to study in animals. This is not to deny that some secondary processes (e.g., awareness of feelings in the generation of behavioral choices) cannot be evaluated in animals with sufficiently clever behavioral learning procedures, as with place-preference procedures and the analysis of changes in learned behaviors after one has induced re-valuation of incentives. Rather, the claim is that a direct neuroscientific study of primary process emotional/affective states is best achieved through the study of the intrinsic (“instinctual”), albeit experientially refined, emotional action tendencies of other animals. In this view, core emotional feelings may reflect the neurodynamic attractor landscapes of a variety of extended trans-diencephalic, limbic emotional action systems-including SEEKING, FEAR, RAGE, LUST, CARE, PANIC, and PLAY. Through a study of these brain systems, the neural infrastructure of human and animal affective consciousness may be revealed. Emotional feelings are instantiated in large-scale neurodynamics that can be most effectively monitored via the ethological analysis of emotional action tendencies and the accompanying brain neurochemical/electrical changes. The intrinsic coherence of such emotional responses is demonstrated by the fact that they can be provoked by electrical and chemical stimulation of specific brain zones-effects that are affectively laden. For substantive progress in this emerging research arena, animal brain researchers need to discuss affective brain functions more openly. Secondary awareness processes, because of their more conditional, contextually situated nature, are more difficult to understand in any neuroscientific detail. In other words, the information-processing brain functions, critical for cognitive consciousness, are harder to study in other animals than the more homologous emotional/motivational affective state functions of the brain.
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Salzen, E. A., & Cornell, J. M. (1968). Self-perception and species recognition in birds. Behaviour, 30(1), 44–65.
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Heath-Lange, S., Ha, J. C., & Sackett, G. P. (1999). Behavioral measurement of temperament in male nursery-raised infant macaques and baboons. Am. J. Primatol., 47(1), 43–50.
Abstract: We define temperament as an individual's set of characteristic behavioral responses to novel or challenging stimuli. This study adapted a temperament scale used with rhesus macaques by Schneider and colleagues [American Journal of Primatology 25:137-155, 1991] for use with male pigtailed macaque (Macaca nemestrina, n = 7), longtailed macaque (M. fascicularis, n = 3), and baboon infants (Papio cynocephalus anubis, n = 4). Subjects were evaluated twice weekly for the first 5 months of age during routine removal from their cages for weighing. Behavioral measures were based on the subject's interactions with a familiar human caretaker and included predominant state before capture, response to capture, contact latency, resistance to tester's hold, degree of clinging, attention to environment, defecation/urination, consolability, facial expression, vocalizations, and irritability. Species differences indicated that baboons were more active than macaques in establishing or terminating contact with the tester. Temperament scores decreased over time for the variables Response to Capture and Contact Latency, indicating that as they grew older, subjects became less reactive and more bold in their interactions with the tester. Temperament scores changed slowly with age, with greater change occurring at younger ages. The retention of variability in reactivity between and within species may be advantageous for primates, reflecting the flexibility necessary to survive in a changing environment.
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Previc, F. H. (2002). Thyroid hormone production in chimpanzees and humans: implications for the origins of human intelligence. Am J Phys Anthropol, 118(4), 402–3; discussion 404–5.
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Palme, R., Rettenbacher, S., Touma, C., El-Bahr, S. M., & Mostl, E. (2005). Stress hormones in mammals and birds: comparative aspects regarding metabolism, excretion, and noninvasive measurement in fecal samples. Ann N Y Acad Sci, 1040, 162–171.
Abstract: A multitude of endocrine mechanisms are involved in coping with challenges. Front-line hormones to overcome stressful situations are glucocorticoids (GCs) and catecholamines (CAs). These hormones are usually determined in plasma samples as parameters of adrenal activity and thus of disturbance. GCs (and CAs) are extensively metabolized and excreted afterwards. Therefore, the concentration of GCs (or their metabolites) can be measured in various body fluids or excreta. Above all, fecal samples offer the advantages of easy collection and a feedback-free sampling procedure. However, large differences exist among species regarding the route and time course of excretion, as well as the types of metabolites formed. Based on information gained from radiometabolism studies (reviewed in this paper), we recently developed and successfully validated different enzyme immunoassays that enable the noninvasive measurement of groups of cortisol or corticosterone metabolites in animal feces. The determination of these metabolites in fecal samples can be used as a powerful tool to monitor GC production in various species of domestic, wildlife, and laboratory animals.
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Heistermann, M., Palme, R., & Ganswindt, A. (2006). Comparison of different enzyme-immunoassays for assessment of adrenocortical activity in primates based on fecal analysis. Am. J. Primatol., 68(3), 257–273.
Abstract: Most studies published to date that used fecal glucocorticoid measurements to assess adrenocortical activity in primate (and many nonprimate) species applied a specific cortisol or corticosterone assay. However, since these native glucocorticoids are virtually absent in the feces of most vertebrates, including primates, the validity of this approach has recently been questioned. Therefore, the overall aim of the present study was to assess the validity of four enzyme-immunoassays (EIAs) using antibodies raised against cortisol, corticosterone, and reduced cortisol metabolites (two group-specific antibodies) for assessing adrenocortical activity using fecal glucocorticoid metabolite (GCM) measurements in selected primate species (marmoset, long-tailed macaque, Barbary macaque, chimpanzee, and gorilla). Using physiological stimulation of the hypothalamo-pituitary-adrenocortical (HPA) axis by administering exogenous ACTH or anesthesia, we demonstrated that at least two assays detected the predicted increase in fecal GCM levels in response to treatment in each species. However, the magnitude of response varied between assays and species, and no one assay was applicable to all species. While the corticosterone assay generally was of only limited suitability for assessing glucocorticoid output, the specific cortisol assay was valuable for those species that (according to high-performance liquid chromatography (HPLC) analysis data) excreted clearly detectable amounts of authentic cortisol into the feces. In contrast, in species in which cortisol was virtually absent in the feces, group-specific assays provided a much stronger signal, and these assays also performed well in the other primate species tested (except the marmoset). Collectively, the data suggest that the reliability of a given fecal glucocorticoid assay in reflecting activity of the HPA axis in primates clearly depends on the species in question. Although to date there is no single assay system that can be used successfully across species, our data suggest that group-specific assays have a high potential for cross-species application. Nevertheless, regardless of which GC antibody is chosen, our study clearly reinforces the necessity of appropriately validating the respective assay system before it is used.
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