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Marten, K., & Psarakos, S. (1995). Using self-view television to distinguish between self-examination and social behavior in the bottlenose dolphin (Tursiops truncatus). Conscious Cogn, 4(2), 205–224.
Abstract: In mirror mark tests dolphins twist, posture, and engage in open-mouth and head movements, often repetitive. Because postures and an open mouth are also dolphin social behaviors, we used self-view television as a manipulatable mirror to distinguish between self-examination and social behavior. Two dolphins were exposed to alternating real-time self-view (“mirror mode”) and playback of the same to determine if they distinguished between them. The adult male engaged in elaborate open-mouth behaviors in mirror mode, but usually just watched when played back the same material. Mirror mode behavior was also compared to interacting with real dolphins (controls). Mark tests were conducted, as well as switches from front to side self-views to see if the dolphins turned. They presented marked areas to the self-view television and turned. The results suggest self-examination over social behavior.
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Anderson, J. R. (1995). Self-recognition in dolphins: credible cetaceans; compromised criteria, controls, and conclusions. Conscious Cogn, 4(2), 239–243.
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Hart, D., & Whitlow, J. W. J. (1995). The experience of self in the bottlenose dolphin. Conscious Cogn, 4(2), 244–247.
Abstract: Marten and Psarakos have presented some evidence which suggests that objective self-awareness and possibly representations of self may characterize the dolphins' experience of self. Their research demonstrates the possibility of similarities in the sense of self between primate species and dolphins, although whether dolphins have subjective self-awareness, personal memories, and theories of self--all important facets of the sense of self in humans--was not examined. Clearly, even this limited evidence was difficult to achieve; the difficulties in adapting methods and coding behavior are quite apparent in their report. Future progress, however, may depend upon clarification of what are the necessary components for a sense of self and an explication of how these might be reflected in dolphin behavior. We are mindful of the authors' point (pp. 219 and 220) that the dolphin lives more in an acoustic than a visual environment. Thus, while tasks relying upon vision may reveal the presence or absence of the sense of self in primates, it might well be the case that in dolphins self-related experiences might be better revealed in auditory tasks. But then, what is the nature of human self-awareness in terms of audition? While both conceptual and methodological hurdles remain, Marten and Psarakos have demonstrated that important questions can be asked about the minds and phenomenal worlds of nonanthropoid species.
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Loveland, K. A. (1995). Self-recognition in the bottlenose dolphin: ecological considerations. Conscious Cogn, 4(2), 254–257.
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Salzen, E. A., & Cornell, J. M. (1968). Self-perception and species recognition in birds. Behaviour, 30(1), 44–65.
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Levy, J. (1977). The mammalian brain and the adaptive advantage of cerebral asymmetry. Ann N Y Acad Sci, 299, 264–272.
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Yokoyama, S., & Radlwimmer, F. B. (1999). The molecular genetics of red and green color vision in mammals. Genetics, 153(2), 919–932.
Abstract: To elucidate the molecular mechanisms of red-green color vision in mammals, we have cloned and sequenced the red and green opsin cDNAs of cat (Felis catus), horse (Equus caballus), gray squirrel (Sciurus carolinensis), white-tailed deer (Odocoileus virginianus), and guinea pig (Cavia porcellus). These opsins were expressed in COS1 cells and reconstituted with 11-cis-retinal. The purified visual pigments of the cat, horse, squirrel, deer, and guinea pig have lambdamax values at 553, 545, 532, 531, and 516 nm, respectively, which are precise to within +/-1 nm. We also regenerated the “true” red pigment of goldfish (Carassius auratus), which has a lambdamax value at 559 +/- 4 nm. Multiple linear regression analyses show that S180A, H197Y, Y277F, T285A, and A308S shift the lambdamax values of the red and green pigments in mammals toward blue by 7, 28, 7, 15, and 16 nm, respectively, and the reverse amino acid changes toward red by the same extents. The additive effects of these amino acid changes fully explain the red-green color vision in a wide range of mammalian species, goldfish, American chameleon (Anolis carolinensis), and pigeon (Columba livia).
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Carroll, J., Murphy, C. J., Neitz, M., Hoeve, J. N., & Neitz, J. (2001). Photopigment basis for dichromatic color vision in the horse. J Vis, 1(2), 80–87.
Abstract: Horses, like other ungulates, are active in the day, at dusk, dawn, and night; and, they have eyes designed to have both high sensitivity for vision in dim light and good visual acuity under higher light levels (Walls, 1942). Typically, daytime activity is associated with the presence of multiple cone classes and color-vision capacity (Jacobs, 1993). Previous studies in other ungulates, such as pigs, goats, cows, sheep and deer, have shown that they have two spectrally different cone types, and hence, at least the photopigment basis for dichromatic color vision (Neitz & Jacobs, 1989; Jacobs, Deegan II, Neitz, Murphy, Miller, & Marchinton, 1994; Jacobs, Deegan II, & Neitz, 1998). Here, electroretinogram flicker photometry was used to measure the spectral sensitivities of the cones in the domestic horse (Equus caballus). Two distinct spectral mechanisms were identified and are consistent with the presence of a short-wavelength-sensitive (S) and a middle-to-long-wavelength-sensitive (M/L) cone. The spectral sensitivity of the S cone was estimated to have a peak of 428 nm, while the M/L cone had a peak of 539 nm. These two cone types would provide the basis for dichromatic color vision consistent with recent results from behavioral testing of horses (Macuda & Timney, 1999; Macuda & Timney, 2000; Timney & Macuda, 2001). The spectral peak of the M/L cone photopigment measured here, in vivo, is similar to that obtained when the gene was sequenced, cloned, and expressed in vitro (Yokoyama & Radlwimmer, 1999). Of the ungulates that have been studied to date, all have the photopigment basis for dichromatic color vision; however, they differ considerably from one another in the spectral tuning of their cone pigments. These differences may represent adaptations to the different visual requirements of different species.
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Wolfe, J. M. (1983). Hidden visual processes. Sci Am, 248(2), 94–103.
Abstract: Isoluminant stimulus is an image whose edges are defined only by a change in color, not by change in brightness. The stimulus here is imperfect: the blue parts and the green parts of the image are only as nearly equal in brightness as they can be on the printed page. Moreover, the change in brightness beyond the edge of the page is apparent, and so is the fact that the reader is holding the magazine at reading distance. When such cues are removed under laboratory conditions, subjects faced with an isoluminant stimulus prove unable to bring its edges into focus. This deficiency contributes to making a familiar face hard to recognize. The experiment indicates that the brain process underlying visual accommodation (the focusing of the eyes) cannot “see” color; it is a hidden process distinct from the processes that lead to perception. The image shows Groucho Marx as he appeared in the motion picture Horse Feathers.
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Dunbar, K., & MacLeod, C. M. (1984). A horse race of a different color: Stroop interference patterns with transformed words. J Exp Psychol Hum Percept Perform, 10(5), 622–639.
Abstract: Four experiments investigated Stroop interference using geometrically transformed words. Over experiments, reading was made increasingly difficult by manipulating orientation uncertainty and the number of noncolor words. As a consequence, time to read color words aloud increased dramatically. Yet, even when reading a color word was considerably slower than naming the color of ink in which the word was printed, Stroop interference persisted virtually unaltered. This result is incompatible with the simple horse race model widely used to explain color-word interference. When reading became extremely slow, a reversed Stroop effect--interference in reading the word due to an incongruent ink color--appeared for one transformation together with the standard Stroop interference. Whether or not the concept of automaticity is invoked, relative speed of processing the word versus the color does not provide an adequate overall explanation of the Stroop phenomenon.
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