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Heyes, C. M. (1994). Social learning in animals: categories and mechanisms. Biol. Rev., 69(2), 207–231.
Abstract: There has been relatively little research on the psychological mechanisms of social learning. This may be due, in part, to the practice of distinguishing categories of social learning in relation to ill-defined mechanisms (Davis, 1973; Galef, 1988). This practice both makes it difficult to identify empirically examples of different types of social learning, and gives the false impression that the mechanisms responsible for social learning are clearly understood. It has been proposed that social learning phenomena be subsumed within the categorization scheme currently used by investigators of asocial learning. This scheme distinguishes categories of learning according to observable conditions, namely, the type of experience that gives rise to a change in an animal (single stimulus vs. stimulus-stimulus relationship vs. response-reinforcer relationship), and the type of behaviour in which this change is detected (response evocation vs. learnability) (Rescorla, 1988). Specifically, three alignments have been proposed: (i) stimulus enhancement with single stimulus learning, (ii) observational conditioning with stimulus-stimulus learning, or Pavlovian conditioning, and (iii) observational learning with response-reinforcer learning, or instrumental conditioning. If, as the proposed alignments suggest, the conditions of social and asocial learning are the same, there is some reason to believe that the mechanisms underlying the two sets of phenomena are also the same. This is so if one makes the relatively uncontroversial assumption that phenomena which occur under similar conditions tend to be controlled by similar mechanisms. However, the proposed alignments are intended to be a set of hypotheses, rather than conclusions, about the mechanisms of social learning; as a basis for further research in which animal learning theory is applied to social learning. A concerted attempt to apply animal learning theory to social learning, to find out whether the same mechanisms are responsible for social and asocial learning, could lead both to refinements of the general theory, and to a better understanding of the mechanisms of social learning. There are precedents for these positive developments in research applying animal learning theory to food aversion learning (e.g. Domjan, 1983; Rozin & Schull, 1988) and imprinting (e.g. Bolhuis, de Vox & Kruit, 1990; Hollis, ten Cate & Bateson, 1991). Like social learning, these phenomena almost certainly play distinctive roles in the antogeny of adaptive behaviour, and they are customarily regarded as 'special kinds' of learning (Shettleworth, 1993).(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)
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Macphail, E. M. (1996). Cognitive function in mammals: the evolutionary perspective. Brain Res Cogn Brain Res, 3(3-4), 279–290.
Abstract: The work of behavioural pharmacologists has concentrated on small animals, such as rodents and pigeons. The validity of extrapolation of their findings to humans depends upon the existence of parallels in both physiology and psychology between these animals and humans. This paper considers the question whether there are in fact substantial cognitive parallels between, first, different non-human groups of vertebrates and, second, non-humans and humans. Behavioural data from 'simple' tasks, such as habituation and conditioning, do not point to species differences among vertebrates. Using examples that concentrate on the performance of rodents and birds, it is argued that, similarly, data from more complex tasks (learning-set formation, transitive inference, and spatial memory serve as examples) reveal few if any cognitive differences amongst non-human vertebrates. This conclusion supports the notion that association formation may be the critical problem-solving process available to non-human animals; associative mechanisms are assumed to have evolved to detect causal links between events, and would therefore be relevant in all ecological niches. In agreement with this view, recent advances in comparative neurology show striking parallels in functional organisation of mammalian and avian telencephalon. Finally, it is argued that although the peculiarly human capacity for language marks a large cognitive contrast between humans and non-humans, there is good evidence-in particular, from work on implicit learning--that the learning mechanisms available to non--humans are present and do play an important role in human cognition.
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Nevin, J. A., & Shettleworth, S. J. (1966). An analysis of contrast effects in multiple schedules. J Exp Anal Behav, 9(4), 305–315.
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Shettleworth, S. J. (1972). Stimulus relevance in the control of drinking and conditioned fear responses in domestic chicks (Gallus gallus). J Comp Physiol Psychol, 80(2), 175–198.
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Roper, K. L., & Zentall, T. R. (1993). Directed forgetting in animals. Psychol Bull, 113(3), 513–532.
Abstract: Directed-forgetting research with animals suggests that animals show disrupted test performance only under certain conditions. Important variables are (a) whether during training, the cue to forget (F cue) signals nonreward (i.e., that the trial is over) versus reward (i.e., that reinforcement can be obtained) and (b) given that reinforcement can be obtained on F-cue trials, whether the post-F-cue response pattern is compatible with the baseline memory task. It is proposed that some findings of directed forgetting can be attributed to trained response biases, whereas others may be attributable perhaps to frustration-produced interference. It is suggested that directed forgetting in animals should be studied using procedures similar to those used to study directed forgetting in humans. This can be accomplished by presenting, within a trial, both to-be-remembered and to-be-forgotten material.
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Zentall, T. R., & Riley, D. A. (2000). Selective attention in animal discrimination learning. J Gen Psychol, 127(1), 45–66.
Abstract: The traditional approach to the study of selective attention in animal discrimination learning has been to ask if animals are capable of the central selective processing of stimuli, such that certain aspects of the discriminative stimuli are partially or wholly ignored while their relationships to each other, or other relevant stimuli, are processed. A notable characteristic of this research has been that procedures involve the acquisition of discriminations, and the issue of concern is whether learning is selectively determined by the stimulus dimension defined by the discriminative stimuli. Although there is support for this kind of selective attention, in many cases, simpler nonattentional accounts are sufficient to explain the results. An alternative approach involves procedures more similar to those used in human information-processing research. When selective attention is studied in humans, it generally involves the steady state performance of tasks for which there is limited time allowed for stimulus input and a relatively large amount of relevant information to be processed; thus, attention must be selective or divided. When this approach is applied to animals and alternative accounts have been ruled out, stronger evidence for selective or divided attention in animals has been found. Similar processes are thought to be involved when animals search more natural environments for targets. Finally, an attempt is made to distinguish these top-down attentional processes from more automatic preattentional processes that have been studied in humans and other animals.
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Dorrance, B. R., & Zentall, T. R. (2002). Imitation of conditional discriminations in pigeons (Columba livia). J Comp Psychol, 116(3), 277–285.
Abstract: In the present experiments, the 2-action method was used to determine whether pigeons could learn to imitate a conditional discrimination. Demonstrator pigeons (Columba livia) stepped on a treadle in the presence of 1 light and pecked at the treadle in the presence of another light. Demonstration did not seem to affect acquisition of the conditional discrimination (Experiment 1) but did facilitate its reversal of the conditional discrimination (Experiments 2 and 3). The results suggest that pigeons are not only able to learn a specific behavior by observing another pigeon, but they can also learn under which circumstances to perform that behavior. The results have implications for proposed mechanisms of imitation in animals.
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Zentall, T. R., Clement, T. S., & Weaver, J. E. (2003). Symmetry training in pigeons can produce functional equivalences. Psychon Bull Rev, 10(2), 387–391.
Abstract: Functional stimulus equivalence has been demonstrated using a transfer of training design with matching-to-sample training in which two sample stimuli are associated with the same comparison stimulus (A-B, C-B; many-to-one matching). Equivalence is shown by training a new association (A-D) and demonstrating the presence of an emergent relation (C-D). In the present experiment, we show that symmetry training, in which a bidirectional association is trained between two stimuli (A-B, B-A, using successive stimulus presentations followed by reinforcement), can also produce functional equivalence using a transfer of training design (i.e., train B-C, test A-C). The results suggest that training pigeons in the substitutability of two stimuli may be sufficient to produce functional stimulus equivalence between them. The results also have implications for the development of an emergent transitive relation, because training on A-B and B-C relations results in the emergence of an untrained A-C relation, if B-A training also is provided.
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Brosnan, S. F., & de Waal, F. B. M. (2005). Responses to a simple barter task in chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes. Primates, 46(3), 173–182.
Abstract: Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) frequently participate in social exchange involving multiple goods and services of variable value, yet they have not been tested in a formalized situation to see whether they can barter using multiple tokens and rewards. We set up a simple barter economy with two tokens and two associated rewards and tested chimpanzees on their ability to obtain rewards by returning the matching token in situations in which their access to tokens was unlimited or limited. Chimpanzees easily learned to associate value with the tokens, as expected, and did barter, but followed a simple strategy of favoring the higher-value token, regardless of the reward proffered, instead of a more complex but more effective strategy of returning the token that matched the reward. This response is similar to that shown by capuchin monkeys in our previous study. We speculate that this response, while not ideal, may be sufficient to allow for stability of the social exchange system in these primates, and that the importance of social barter to both species may have led to this convergence of strategies.
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