|
Cattell, R. B., & Korth, B. (1973). The isolation of temperament dimensions in dogs. Behav Biol, 9(1), 15–30.
|
|
|
Epstein, R. (1985). Animal cognition as the praxist views it. Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 9(4), 623–630.
Abstract: The distinction between psychology and praxics provides a clear answer to the question of animal cognition. As Griffin and others have noted, the kinds of behavioral phenomena that lead psychologists to speak of cognition in humans are also observed in nonhuman animals, and therefore those who are convinced of the legitimacy of psychology should not hesitate to speak of and to attempt to study animal cognition. The behavior of organisms is also a legitimate subject matter, and praxics, the study of behavior, has led to significant advances in our understanding of the kinds of behaviors that lead psychologists to speak of cognition. Praxics is a biological science; the attempt by students of behavior to appropriate psychology has been misguided. Generativity theory is an example of a formal theory of behavior that has proved useful both in the engineering of intelligent performances in nonhuman animals and in the prediction of intelligent performances in humans.
|
|
|
Puppe, B. (1996). [Social dominance and rank relationships in domestic pigs: a critical review]. Berl Munch Tierarztl Wochenschr, 109(11-12), 457–464.
Abstract: Viewing dominance as an attribute of repeated agonistic interactions between two individuals, the present paper reviews theoretical approaches towards concepts of dominance, methods of measurement, and basic principles and problems connected with social dominance in domestic pigs. Domestic pigs are able to establish social organization structures during all stages of their ontogeny. According to definition, dominance relationships occur when a consistent asymmetry of the result of dyadic agonistic interactions can be assessed. This must not necessarily be connected immediately with a better availability of resources, or a high stability of existing dominance relationships, or a functional definition of dominance. When sociometric characteristics are calculated, it seems to be appropriate to use them for different levels of a biological system (individual, individual pair, group). Investigations of social behaviour and dominance in farm animals should take into account that mechanisms of social behaviour in confined environments are often carried out in parts only. Connections of the dominance concept with other concepts of behavioural regulation should be theoretically considered and further investigated by experimental studies.
|
|
|
Church, R. M. (1997). Quantitative models of animal learning and cognition. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 23(4), 379–389.
Abstract: This article reviews the prerequisites for quantitative models of animal learning and cognition, describes the types of models, provides a rationale for the development of such quantitative models, describes criteria for their evaluation, and makes recommendations for the next generation of quantitative models. A modular approach to the development of models is described in which a procedure is considered as a generator of stimuli and a model is considered as a generator of responses. The goal is to develop models that, in combination with many different procedures, produce sequences of times of occurrence of events (stimuli and responses) that are indistinguishable from those produced by the animal under many experimental procedures and data analysis techniques.
|
|
|
de Wall, F. B., & Aureli, F. (1997). Conflict resolution and distress alleviation in monkeys and apes. Ann N Y Acad Sci, 807, 317–328.
Abstract: Research on nonhuman primates has produced compelling evidence for reconciliation and consolation, that is, postconflict contacts that serve to respectively repair social relationships and reassure distressed individuals, such as victims of attack. This has led to a view of conflict and conflict resolution as an integrated part of social relationships, hence determined by social factors and modifiable by the social environment. Implications of this new model of social conflict are discussed along with evidence for behavioral flexibility, the value of cooperation, and the possibility that distress alleviation rests on empathy, a capacity that may be present in chimpanzees and humans but not in most other animals.
|
|
|
Fischer, J., Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (2000). Development of infant baboons' responses to graded bark variants. Proc Biol Sci, 267(1459), 2317–2321.
Abstract: We studied the development of infant baboons' (Papio cynocephalus ursinus) responses to conspecific 'barks' in a free-ranging population in the Okavango Delta, Botswana. These barks grade from tonal, harmonically rich calls into calls with a more noisy, harsh structure. Typically, tonal variants are given when the signaller is at risk of losing contact with the group or a particular individual ('contact barks'), whereas harsh variants are given in response to predators ('alarm barks'). We conducted focal observations and playback experiments in which we presented variants of barks recorded from resident adult females. By six months of age, infants reliably discriminated between typical alarm and contact barks and they responded more strongly to intermediate alarm calls than to typical contact barks. Infants of six months and older also recognized their mothers by voice. The ability to discriminate between different call variants developed with increasing age. At two and a half months of age, infants failed to respond at all, whereas at four months they responded irrespective of the call type that was presented. At six months, infants showed adult-like responses by responding strongly to alarm barks but ignoring contact barks. We concluded that infants gradually learn to attach the appropriate meaning to alarm and contact barks.
|
|
|
Whiten, A. (2000). Social complexity and social intelligence. In Novartis Foundation Symposium (Vol. 233, pp. 185–96; discussion pp. 196–201).
Abstract: When we talk of the 'nature of intelligence', or any other attribute, we may be referring to its essential structure, or to its place in nature, particularly the function it has evolved to serve. Here I examine both, from the perspective of the evolution of intelligence in primates. Over the last 20 years, the Social (or 'Machiavellian') Intelligence Hypothesis has gained empirical support. Its core claim is that the intelligence of primates is primarily an adaptation to the special complexities of primate social life. In addition to this hypothesis about the function of intellect, a secondary claim is that the very structure of intelligence has been moulded to be 'social' in character, an idea that presents a challenge to orthodox views of intelligence as a general-purpose capacity. I shall outline the principal components of social intelligence and the environment of social complexity it engages with. This raises the question of whether domain specificity is an appropriate characterization of social intelligence and its subcomponents, like theory of mind. As a counter-argument to such specificity I consider the hypothesis that great apes exhibit a cluster of advanced cognitive abilities that rest on a shared capacity for second-order mental representation.
|
|
|
Broom, M. (2002). A unified model of dominance hierarchy formation and maintenance. J. Theor. Biol., 219(1), 63–72.
Abstract: In many different species it is common for animals to spend large portions of their lives in groups. Such groups need to divide available resources amongst the individuals they contain and this is often achieved by means of a dominance hierarchy. Sometimes hierarchies are stable over a long period of time and new individuals slot into pre-determined positions, but there are many situations where this is not so and a hierarchy is formed out of a group of individuals meeting for the first time. There are several different models both of the formation of such dominance hierarchies and of already existing hierarchies. These models often treat the two phases as entirely separate, whereas in reality, if there is a genuine formation phase to the hierarchy, behaviour in this phase will be governed by the rewards available, which in turn depends upon how the hierarchy operates once it has been formed. This paper describes a method of unifying models of these two distinct phases, assuming that the hierarchy formed is stable. In particular a framework is introduced which allows a variety of different models of each of the two parts to be used in conjunction with each other, thus enabling a wide range of situations to be modelled. Some examples are given to show how this works in practice.
|
|
|
Pepperberg, I. M. (2002). In search of king Solomon's ring: cognitive and communicative studies of Grey parrots (Psittacus erithacus). Brain Behav Evol, 59(1-2), 54–67.
Abstract: During the past 24 years, I have used a modeling technique (M/R procedure) to train Grey parrots to use an allospecific code (English speech) referentially; I then use the code to test their cognitive abilities. The oldest bird, Alex, labels more than 50 different objects, 7 colors, 5 shapes, quantities to 6, 3 categories (color, shape, material) and uses 'no', 'come here', wanna go X' and 'want Y' (X and Y are appropriate location or item labels). He combines labels to identify, request, comment upon or refuse more than 100 items and to alter his environment. He processes queries to judge category, relative size, quantity, presence or absence of similarity/difference in attributes, and show label comprehension. He semantically separates labeling from requesting. He thus exhibits capacities once presumed limited to humans or nonhuman primates. Studies on this and other Greys show that parrots given training that lacks some aspect of input present in M/R protocols (reference, functionality, social interaction) fail to acquire referential English speech. Examining how input affects the extent to which parrots acquire an allospecific code may elucidate mechanisms of other forms of exceptional learning: learning unlikely in the normal course of development but that can occur under certain conditions.
|
|
|
Pepperberg, I. M. (2002). The value of the Piagetian framework for comparative cognitive studies. Anim. Cogn., 5(3), 177–182.
Abstract: Although the Piagetian framework has been used by numerous researchers to compare cognitive abilities of diverse species, the system is often criticized as implemented. I examine the various criticisms, suggest ways in which the system can be improved, and argue for the need for descriptive systems such as the Piagetian framework to complement programs that look for cellular and molecular bases or mathematical models to explain behavior.
|
|