Abstract: Animals that forage socially often stand to gain from coordination of their behaviour. Yet it is not known how group members reach a consensus on the timing of foraging bouts. Here we demonstrate a simple process by which this may occur. We develop a state-dependent, dynamic game model of foraging by a pair of animals, in which each individual chooses between resting or foraging during a series of consecutive periods, so as to maximize its own individual chances of survival. We find that, if there is an advantage to foraging together, the equilibrium behaviour of both individuals becomes highly synchronized. As a result of this synchronization, differences in the energetic reserves of the two players spontaneously develop, leading them to adopt different behavioural roles. The individual with lower reserves emerges as the 'pace-maker' who determines when the pair should forage, providing a straightforward resolution to the problem of group coordination. Moreover, the strategy that gives rise to this behaviour can be implemented by a simple 'rule of thumb' that requires no detailed knowledge of the state of other individuals.

Abstract: Groups of animals often need to make communal decisions, for example about which activities to perform, when to perform them and which direction to travel in; however, little is known about how they do so. Here, we model the fitness consequences of two possible decision-making mechanisms: 'despotism' and 'democracy'. We show that under most conditions, the costs to subordinate group members, and to the group as a whole, are considerably higher for despotic than for democratic decisions. Even when the despot is the most experienced group member, it only pays other members to accept its decision when group size is small and the difference in information is large. Democratic decisions are more beneficial primarily because they tend to produce less extreme decisions, rather than because each individual has an influence on the decision per se. Our model suggests that democracy should be widespread and makes quantitative, testable predictions about group decision-making in non-humans.

Abstract: Evolutionary theory predicts that mothers of different condition should adjust the birth sex ratio of their offspring in relation to future reproductive benefits. Published studies addressing variation in mammalian sex ratios have produced surprisingly contradictory results. Explaining the source of such variation has been a challenge for sex-ratio theory, not least because no mechanism for sex-ratio adjustment is known. I conducted a meta-analysis of previous mammalian sex-ratio studies to determine if there are any overall patterns in sex-ratio variation. The contradictory nature of previous results was confirmed. However, studies that investigated indices of condition around conception show almost unanimous support for the prediction that mothers in good condition bias their litters towards sons. Recent research on the role of glucose in reproductive functioning have shown that excess glucose favours the development of male blastocysts, providing a potential mechanism for sex-ratio variation in relation to maternal condition around conception. Furthermore, many of the conflicting results from studies on sex-ratio adjustment would be explained if glucose levels in utero during early cell division contributed to the determination of offspring sex ratios.

Abstract: Although many variants of the hawk-dove game predict the frequency at which group foraging animals should compete aggressively, none of them can explain why a large number of group foraging animals share food clumps without any overt aggression. One reason for this shortcoming is that hawk-dove games typically consider only a single contest, while most group foraging situations involve opponents that interact repeatedly over discovered food clumps. The present iterated hawk-dove game predicts that in situations that are analogous to a prisoner's dilemma, animals should share the resources without aggression, provided that the number of simultaneously available food clumps is sufficiently large and the number of competitors is relatively small. However, given that the expected gain of an aggressive animal is more variable than the gain expected by nonaggressive individuals, the predicted effect of the number of food items in a clump-clump richness-depends on whether only the mean or both the mean and variability associated with payoffs are considered. More precisely, the deterministic game predicts that aggression should increase with clump richness, whereas the stochastic risk-sensitive game predicts that the frequency of encounters resulting in aggression should peak at intermediate clump richnesses or decrease with increasing clump richness if animals show sensitivity to the variance or coefficient of variation, respectively.

Abstract: Methods to describe dominance hierarchies are a key tool in primatology studies. Most current methods are appropriate for analyzing linear and near-linear hierarchies; however, more complex structures are common in primate groups. We propose a method termed “dominance-directed tree.” This method is based on graph theory and set theory to analyze dominance relationships in social groups. The method constructs a transitive matrix by imposing transitivity to the dominance matrix and produces a graphical representation of the dominance relationships, which allows an easy visualization of the hierarchical position of the individuals, or subsets of individuals. The method is also able to detect partial and complete hierarchies, and to describe situations in which hierarchical and nonhierarchical principles operate. To illustrate the method, we apply a dominance tree analysis to artificial data and empirical data from a group of Cebus apella.