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Shettleworth, S. J. (1985). Foraging, memory, and constraints on learning. Ann N Y Acad Sci, 443, 216–226.
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Bloom, P. (2004). Behavior. Can a dog learn a word? Science, 304(5677), 1605–1606.
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Zentall, T. R. (2002). A cognitive behaviorist approach to the study of animal behavior. J Gen Psychol, 129(4), 328–363.
Abstract: Traditional psychological approaches to animal learning and behavior have involved either the atheoretical behaviorist approach proposed by B. F. Skinner (1938), in which input-output relations are described in response to environmental manipulations, or the theoretical behaviorist approach offered by C. L Hull (1943), in which associations mediated by several hypothetical constructs and intervening variables are formed between stimuli and responses. Recently, the application of a cognitive behaviorist approach to animal learning and behavior has been found to have considerable value as a research tool. This perspective has grown out of E. C. Tolman's cognitive approach to learning in which behavior is mediated by mechanisms that are not directly observable but can be inferred from the results of critical experiments. In the present article, the author presents several examples of the successful application of the cognitive behaviorist approach. In each case, the experiments have been designed to distinguish between more traditional mechanisms and those mediated by hypothesized internal representations. These examples were selected because the evidence suggests that some form of active cognitive organization is needed to account for the behavioral results.
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Devenport, J. A., Patterson, M. R., & Devenport, L. D. (2005). Dynamic averaging and foraging decisions in horses (Equus callabus). J. Comp. Psychol., 119(3), 352–358.
Abstract: The variability of most environments taxes foraging decisions by increasing the uncertainty of the information available. One solution to the problem is to use dynamic averaging, as do some granivores and carnivores. Arguably, the same strategy could be useful for grazing herbivores, even though their food renews and is more homogeneously distributed. Horses (Equus callabus) were given choices between variable patches after short or long delays. When patch information was current, horses returned to the patch that was recently best, whereas those without current information matched choices to the long-term average values of the patches. These results demonstrate that a grazing species uses dynamic averaging and indicate that, like granivores and carnivores, they can use temporal weighting to optimize foraging decisions.
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Zentall, T. R. (2006). Mental time travel in animals: a challenging question. Behav. Process., 72(2), 173–183.
Abstract: Humans have the ability to mentally recreate past events (using episodic memory) and imagine future events (by planning). The best evidence for such mental time travel is personal and thus subjective. For this reason, it is particularly difficult to study such behavior in animals. There is some indirect evidence, however, that animals have both episodic memory and the ability to plan for the future. When unexpectedly asked to do so, animals can report about their recent past experiences (episodic memory) and they also appear to be able to use the anticipation of a future event as the basis for a present action (planning). Thus, the ability to imagine past and future events may not be uniquely human.
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Zentall, T. R. (2005). Timing, memory for intervals, and memory for untimed stimuli: the role of instructional ambiguity. Behav. Process., 70(3), 209–222.
Abstract: Theories of animal timing have had to account for findings that the memory for the duration of a timed interval appears to be dramatically shorted within a short time of its termination. This finding has led to the subjective shortening hypothesis and it has been proposed to account for the poor memory that animals appear to have for the initial portion of a timed interval when a gap is inserted in the to-be-timed signal. It has also been proposed to account for the poor memory for a relatively long interval that has been discriminated from a shorter interval. I suggest here a simpler account in which ambiguity between the gap or retention interval and the intertrial interval results in resetting the clock, rather than forgetting the interval. The ambiguity hypothesis, together with a signal salience mechanism that determines how quickly the clock is reset at the start of the intertrial interval can account for the results of the reported timing experiments that have used the peak procedure. Furthermore, instructional ambiguity rather than memory loss may account for the results of many animal memory experiments that do not involve memory for time.
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Schwartz, B. L., & Evans, S. (2001). Episodic memory in primates. Am. J. Primatol., 55(2), 71–85.
Abstract: Episodic memory refers to a system of memory with the capacity to recollect specific events from an individual's life. Some psychologists have suggested that episodic memory is a uniquely human phenomenon. We challenge that idea and present evidence that great apes and other primates may possess episodic-like memory. We review criteria developed to assess episodic-like memory in nonhumans, and how they apply to primates. In particular, we discuss the criteria of Clayton et al. [2001], who stated that episodic-like memory is based on the retrieval of multiple and integrated components of an event. We then review eight studies examining memory in great apes and apply the Clayton et al. criteria to each of them. We summarize the evidence that is compatible with the existence of episodic-like memory, although none of the data completely satisfy the Clayton et al. criteria. Morover, feelings of pastness and feelings of confidence, which mark episodic memory in humans, have not been empirically addressed in nonhuman primates. Future studies should be directed at these aspects of memory in primates. We speculate on the functional significance of episodic memory in nonhuman primates.
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Ikeda, M., Patterson, K., Graham, K. S., Ralph, M. A. L., & Hodges, J. R. (2006). A horse of a different colour: do patients with semantic dementia recognise different versions of the same object as the same? Neuropsychologia, 44(4), 566–575.
Abstract: Ten patients with semantic dementia resulting from bilateral anterior temporal lobe atrophy, and 10 matched controls, were tested on an object recognition task in which they were invited to choose (from a four-item array) the picture representing “the same thing” as an object picture that they had just inspected and attempted to name. The target in the response array was never physically identical to the studied picture but differed from it – in the various conditions – in size, angle of view, colour or exemplar (e.g. a different breed of dog). In one test block for each patient, the response array was presented immediately after the studied picture was removed; in another block, a 2 min filled delay was inserted between study and test. The patients performed relatively well when the studied object and target response differed only in the size of the picture on the page, but were significantly impaired as a group in the other three type-of-change conditions, even with no delay between study and test. The five patients whose structural brain imaging revealed major right-temporal atrophy were more impaired overall, and also more affected by the 2 min delay, than the five patients with an asymmetric pattern characterised by predominant left-sided atrophy. These results are interpreted in terms of a hypothesis that successful classification of an object token as an object type is not a pre-semantic ability but rather results from interaction of perceptual and conceptual processing.
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Shettleworth, S. J. (1993). Varieties of learning and memory in animals. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 19(1), 5–14.
Abstract: It is often assumed that there is more than one kind of learning--or more than one memory system--each of which is specialized for a different function. Yet, the criteria by which the varieties of learning and memory should be distinguished are seldom clear. Learning and memory phenomena can differ from one another across species or situations (and thus be specialized) in a number of different ways. What is needed is a consistent theoretical approach to the whole range of learning phenomena, and one is explored here. Parallels and contrasts in the study of sensory systems illustrate one way to integrate the study of general mechanisms with an appreciation of species-specific adaptations.
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Urcuioli, P. J., & Zentall, T. R. (1986). Retrospective coding in pigeons' delayed matching-to-sample. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 12(1), 69–77.
Abstract: In this study we examined how coding processes in pigeons' delayed matching-to-sample were affected by the stimuli to be remembered. In Experiment 1, two groups of pigeons initially learned 0-delay matching-to-sample with identical comparison stimuli (vertical and horizontal lines) but with different sample stimuli (red and green hues or vertical and horizontal lines). Longer delays were then introduced between sample offset and comparison onset to assess whether pigeons were prospectively coding the same events (viz., the correct line comparisons) or retrospectively coding different events (viz., their respective sample stimuli). The hue-sample group matched more accurately and showed a slower rate of forgetting than the line-sample group. In Experiment 2, pigeons were trained with either hues or lines as both sample and comparison stimuli, or with hue samples and line comparisons or vice versa. Subsequent delay tests revealed that the hue-sample groups remembered more accurately and generally showed slower rates of forgetting than the line-sample groups. Comparison dimension had little or no effect on performance. Together, these data suggest that pigeons retrospectively code the samples in delayed matching-to-sample.
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