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Author |
Hemelrijk C K |
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Title |
A matrix partial correlation test used in investigations of reciprocity and other social interaction patterns at group level |
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Journal Article |
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1990 |
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Journal of theoretical biology |
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J. Theor. Biol. |
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143 |
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3 |
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405-420 |
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Reciprocity and other social interaction patterns can be studied at two levels, within pairs (i.e. dyadic level) and among pairs (i.e. at group level). In this paper advantages of the latter approach are emphasized. However, an analysis at group level implies the correlation of interaction matrices and because such data are statistically dependent, the significance of a correlation has to be calculated in a special way |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
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5050 |
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Author |
James, R.; Bennett, P.G.; Krause, J. |
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Title |
Geometry for mutualistic and selfish herds: the limited domain of danger |
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Journal Article |
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2004 |
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Journal of Theoretical Biology |
Abbreviated Journal |
J. Theor. Biol. |
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228 |
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1 |
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107-113 |
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Aggregation; Selfish herd; Limited domains |
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We present a two-dimensional individual-based model of aggregation behaviour in animals by introducing the concept of a “limited domain of danger”, which represents either a limited detection range or a limited attack range of predators. The limited domain of danger provides a suitable framework for the analysis of individual movement rules under real-life conditions because it takes into account the predator's prey detection and capture abilities. For the first time, a single geometrical construct can be used to analyse the predation risk of both peripheral and central individuals in a group. Furthermore, our model provides a conceptual framework that can be equally applied to aggregation behaviour and refuge use and thus presents a conceptual advance on current theory that treats these antipredator behaviours separately. An analysis of individual movement rules using limited domains of danger showed that the time minimization strategy outcompetes the nearest neighbour strategy proposed by Hamilton's (J. Theor. Biol. 31 (1971) 295) selfish herd model, whereas a random strategy confers no benefit and can even be disadvantageous. The superior performance of the time minimization strategy highlights the importance of taking biological constraints, such as an animal's orientation relative to its neighbours, into account when searching for efficient movement rules underlying the aggregation process. |
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refbase @ user @ |
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552 |
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Marinier, S.L.; Alexander, A.J. |
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Title |
Coprophagy as an avenue for foals of the domestic horse to learn food preferences from their dams |
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Year |
1995 |
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Journal of Theoretical Biology |
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J. Theor. Biol. |
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173 |
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2 |
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121-124 |
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Observation of foal development shows that the appearance of adult-type motor grazing behaviour, selection of grass vs. non-grass and the avoidance of poisonous plants occur concurrently between the ages of 4 and 6 weeks. Suckling behaviour and close association of foal with dam change with time but show no particular coincidence with grazing behavioural changes. Coprophagy of the foal on maternal faeces does, however, correspond chronologically with the foal learning to graze selectively. This correspondence suggests that, as well as other uses, in domestic horses coprophagy may function to imprint on the foal the food-selective values of its dam. |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
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3626 |
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Mesterton-Gibbons, M.; Gavrilets, S.; Gravner, J.; Akçay, E. |
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Title |
Models of coalition or alliance formation |
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Journal Article |
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2011 |
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Journal of Theoretical Biology |
Abbreviated Journal |
J. Theor. Biol. |
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274 |
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1 |
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187-204 |
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Game theory; Cooperation |
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More than half a century has now elapsed since coalition or alliance formation theory (CAFT) was first developed. During that time, researchers have amassed a vast amount of detailed and high-quality data on coalitions or alliances among primates and other animals. But models have not kept pace, and more relevant theory is needed. In particular, even though CAFT is primarily an exercise in polyadic game theory, game theorists have devoted relatively little attention to questions that motivate field research, and much remains largely unexplored. The state of the art is both a challenge and an opportunity. In this review we describe a variety of game-theoretic and related modelling approaches that have much untapped potential to address the questions that field biologists ask. |
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0022-5193 |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
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5322 |
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Nakamaru, M.; Sasaki, A. |
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Title |
Can transitive inference evolve in animals playing the hawk-dove game? |
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Journal Article |
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2003 |
Publication |
Journal of Theoretical Biology |
Abbreviated Journal |
J. Theor. Biol. |
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222 |
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4 |
Pages |
461-470 |
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Hawk-dove game; Ess; Transitive inference; Resource holding potential |
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What should an individual do if there are no reliable cues to the strength of a competitor when fighting with it for resources? We herein examine the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in the hawk-dove game, if the opponent's resource-holding potential (RHP) can only indirectly be inferred from the outcome of past interactions in the population. The strategies we examined include the classical mixed strategy in which no information on past games is utilized, the `imprinting' strategy in which a player increases/decreases its aggressiveness if it wins/loses a game, the `immediate inference' strategy in which a player can infer the strength of those opponents it fought before, and the `transitive inference' strategy in which a player can infer the strength of a new opponent through a third party with which both players have fought before. Invasibility analysis for each pair of strategies revealed that (i) the transitive-inference strategy can always invade the mixed strategy and the imprinting strategy, and itself refuses invasion by these strategies; (ii) the largest advantage for transitive inference is achieved when the number of games played per individual in one generation is small and when the cost of losing an escalated game is large; (iii) the immediate inference, rather than the transitive inference, can be an ESS if the cost of fighting is small; (iv) a strong linear ranking is established in the population of transitive-inference strategists, though it does not perfectly correlate to the ranking by actual RHPs. We found that the advantage of the transitive inference is not in its ability to correct a misassessment (it is actually the worst in doing so), but in the ability of quickly lining up either incorrect or correct assessments to form a linear dominance hierarchy. |
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refbase @ user @ |
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601 |
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Author |
Parker, G.A. |
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Title |
Assessment strategy and the evolution of fighting behaviour |
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Journal Article |
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Year |
1974 |
Publication |
Journal of Theoretical Biology |
Abbreviated Journal |
J. Theor. Biol. |
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47 |
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1 |
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223-243 |
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The view is examined that the adaptive value of conventional aspects of fighting behaviour is for assessment of relative RHP (resource holding power) of the combatants. Outcomes of aggressive disputes should be decided by each individual's fitness budget available for expenditure during a fight (determined by the fitness difference between adoption of alternative strategies, escalation or withdrawal without escalation) and on the rate of expenditure of the fitness budget if escalation occurs (determined by the RHPs of the combatants). Thus response thresholds for alternative strategies (“assessments”) will be determined by natural selection on a basis of which opponent is likely to expend its fitness budget first, should escalation occur. This “loser” should retreat (before escalation) and the winner should stay in possession of the resource. Many aggressive decisions depend on whether one is a resource holder, or an attacker. Assuming the RHP of the combatants to be equal, there are many instances of fitness pay-off imbalances between holder and attacker which should weight the dispute outcome in favour of one or other opponent by allowing it a greater expendable fitness budget. Usually the weighting favours the holder; the attacker therefore needs a correspondingly higher RHP before it may be expected to win. This is not invariably the case, and much observed data fits the predictions of this sort of model. If assessments are perfect and budget expenditure rates exactly predictable, then there would never seem to be any case for escalation. Escalation can be explained in terms of injury inflictions (expenditures) occurring as discrete events; i.e. as “bouts” won or lost during fighting. Assessment can give only a probabilistic prediction of the outcome of a bout. A simple model is developed to investigate escalation situations. Each combatant assesses relative RHP; this correlates with an absolute probability of winning the next bout (cabs). The stake played for is infliction of loss of RHP and is determined by the fitness budgets of the opponents. (Each individual plays for the withdrawal of its opponent.) This defines a critical probability of winning (ccrit) for each combatant, above which escalation is the favourable strategy (cabs > ccrit) and below which withdrawal is favourable (cabs < ccrit). Escalation should occur only where cabs-ccrit is positive for both combatants. This model gives predictions compatible with the observations, indicating that RHP loss alone can be adequate to explain withdrawal: escalation behaviour. Withdrawal tendency will be increased by low searching costs. Escalations should be restricted to closely matched RHP opponents if RHP disparity is the major imbalance. Outside the “escalation range” of a given individual, the higher RHP individual wins and the lower one loses (i.e. it should withdraw after conventional display). RHP disparity and holder: attacker imbalance should both interact to shape the observed pattern, though their relative importances will depend on species and situation. In some instances selection may favour immediate withdrawal from an occupied territory even without assessment of RHP. |
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0022-5193 |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
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4935 |
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Author |
Reluga, T.C.; Viscido, S. |
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Title |
Simulated evolution of selfish herd behavior |
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Journal Article |
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Year |
2005 |
Publication |
Journal of Theoretical Biology |
Abbreviated Journal |
J. Theor. Biol. |
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Volume |
234 |
Issue |
2 |
Pages |
213-225 |
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Keywords |
Selfish herd; Behavior; Evolution; Predation risk |
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Single species aggregations are a commonly observed phenomenon. One potential explanation for these aggregations is provided by the selfish herd hypothesis, which states that aggregations result from individual efforts to reduce personnel predation risk at the expense of group-mates. Not all movement rules based on the selfish herd hypothesis are consistent with observed animal behavior. Previous work has shown that herd-like aggregations are not generated by movement rules limited to local interactions between nearest neighbors. Instead, rules generating realistic herds appear to require delocalized interactions. To date, it has been an open question whether or not the necessary delocalization can emerge from local interactions under natural selection. To address this question, we study an individual-based model with a single quantitative genetic trait that controls the influence of neighbors as a function of distance. The results indicate that predation-based selection can increase the influence of distant neighbors relative to near neighbors. Our results lend support for the idea that selfish herd behavior can arise from localized movement rules under natural selection. |
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553 |
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Seyfarth, R.M. |
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A model of social grooming among adult female monkeys |
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Journal Article |
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1977 |
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Journal of Theoretical Biology |
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J. Theor. Biol. |
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65 |
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4 |
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671-698 |
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Animals; Behavior, Animal; Female; *Grooming; Haplorhini/*physiology; *Models, Biological; Reproduction; Social Dominance; Time Factors |
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Grooming networks among adult female monkeys exhibit two similar features across a number of different species. High-ranking animals receive more grooming than others, and the majority of grooming occurs between females of adjacent rank. A theoretical model which duplicates these features is presented, and the properties of the model are used to explain the possible causation and function of female grooming behaviour. The model illustrates how relatively simple principles governing the behaviour of individuals may be used to explain more complex aspects of the social structure of non-human primate groups. |
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0022-5193 |
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PMID:406485 |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
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5259 |
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Suzuki, Y.; Toquenaga, Y. |
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Title |
Effects of information and group structure on evolution of altruism: analysis of two-score model by covariance and contextual analyses |
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Journal Article |
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2005 |
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Journal of theoretical biology |
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J. Theor. Biol. |
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232 |
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2 |
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191-201 |
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*Altruism; Analysis of Variance; *Communication; Cooperative Behavior; *Evolution; Game Theory; *Group Structure; Humans; Models, Genetic; Models, Psychological; Selection (Genetics); Trust |
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An altruistic individual has to gamble on cooperation to a stranger because it does not know whether the stranger is trustworthy before direct interaction. Nowak and Sigmund (Nature 393 (1998a) 573; J. Theor. Biol. 194 (1998b) 561) presented a new theoretical framework of indirect reciprocal altruism by image scoring game where all individuals are informed about a partner's behavior from its image score without direct interaction. Interestingly, in a simplified version of the image scoring game, the evolutionarily stability condition for altruism became a similar form of Hamilton's rule, i.e. inequality that the probability of getting correct information is more than the ratio of cost to benefit. Since the Hamilton's rule was derived by evolutionarily stable analysis, the evolutionary meaning of the probability of getting correct information has not been clearly examined in terms of kin and group selection. In this study, we applied covariance analysis to the two-score model for deriving the Hamilton's rule. We confirmed that the probability of getting correct information was proportional to the bias of altruistic interactions caused by using information about a partner's image score. The Hamilton's rule was dependent on the number of game bouts even though the information reduced the risk of cooperation to selfish one at the first encounter. In addition, we incorporated group structure to the two-score model to examine whether the probability of getting correct information affect selection for altruism by group selection. We calculated a Hamilton's rule of group selection by contextual analysis. Group selection is very effective when either the probability of getting correct information or that of future interaction, or both are low. The two Hamilton's rules derived by covariance and contextual analyses demonstrated the effects of information and group structure on the evolution of altruism. We inferred that information about a partner's behavior and group structure can produce flexible pathways for the evolution of altruism. |
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Integrative Environmental Sciences, Graduate School of Life and Environmental Sciences, University of Tsukuba, 1-1-1, Ten-Nou-Dai, Tsukuba, Ibaraki 305-8572, Japan. yukari@pe.ies.life.tsukuba.ac.jp |
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PMID:15530489 |
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refbase @ user @ |
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556 |
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Thierry, B. |
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Feedback loop between kinship and dominance: the macaque model |
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Journal Article |
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1990 |
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Journal of Theoretical Biology |
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J. Theor. Biol. |
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145 |
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4 |
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511-522 |
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There is growing evidence that macaque social systems represent sets of coadapted traits in which strength of hierarchies and degree of nepotism covary. A framework is developed to explain the link between dominance and kinship phenomena, assuming that power brought by alliances among non-kin is allometrically related to those involving relatives. This can account for the type of social relationships observed in “despotic” systems vs. “egalitarian” ones. When social bonds are mostly founded on kinship, lineages are closed and social power generated by coalitions among relatives may reach high levels; social power frequently outweighs the fighting abilities of single individuals, and asymmetry of dominance between group members may be marked. When lineages are more open, social bonds and alliances are less kin-biased, social relationships are more equal, and as the influence of coalitions is less important, the individual retains a certain degree of freedom in relation to the power of kin-networks. Acknowledging that the balance between individual and social power is not set at the same level across different species can explain a number of variations in rules of rank inheritance and relative dominance of males and females among macaques. The framework illustrates how epigenetic processes may shape complex features of primate social systems, and offers opportunities for testing. |
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